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ABSTRACT 
The majority of Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) 
preparedness grants were created in the wake of 9/11 through the Department of 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Act). These grants, as required by the Act, are 
predicated on addressing terrorism preparedness. The National Preparedness Goal (the 
Goal) was introduced in 2011 to provide an all-hazards capability-based system to 
measure the nation’s level of preparedness. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if 
FEMA’s preparedness grants are allowing the Goal to be achieved and examine if 
the grant programs can be adjusted to better align with the strategic intent of the Goal. 
This research examined homeland security capabilities and federal grant 
programs to determine if a nexus to terrorism has created any limitations. The results 
of the national preparedness reports from 2014 to 2018 are also examined to determine 
if the nation is moving in the right direction regarding preparedness. Several 
preliminary ideas are offered to improve alignment of grant programs with the Goal. A 
recommendation is also made for FEMA to develop a process to understand better how 
grant funds are impacting capabilities. 
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The majority of Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) 
preparedness grant programs were formed in the wake of the terror attacks on 9/11. The 
focus of these programs was to prepare the nation not only to prevent, but respond to, and 
recover from another terror incident. The National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) was 
rolled out in 2011. The Goal provides the nation a way to measure national preparedness 
for all hazards through the lens of the 32 core capabilities. Despite the Goal being in 
existence for nearly 10 years, and the absence of another major terror attack, FEMA’s 
preparedness grants remain predicated on terrorism preparedness. The purpose of this 
research is to determine how FEMA’s preparedness grant programs can be adjusted to align 
better with the strategic intent of the Goal. 
A. METHOD 
This research consists of four parts. In the first part, the 32 core capabilities that 
comprise the Goal are analyzed to determine if the nexus to terrorism required by most 
FEMA preparedness grants place limitations on building the individual capabilities. Next, 
the results of the National Preparedness Report (NPR) are examined to see which 
capabilities have advanced and which areas can be improved. The NPR provides an annual 
snapshot of the nation’s progress toward achieving the Goal. With a better understanding 
of the capabilities and progress made toward achieving the Goal, a historical analysis of 
the legislation, congressional authorizations and appropriations is performed to discover 
what, if any adjustments have been made to align these programs better with the strategic 
intent of the Goal. Additionally, the return on investment of the respective grant programs 
is examined. The final part of the analysis examines FEMA’s failed attempt to align the 
preparedness grant programs with the strategic intent of the Goal. This research provides 
insight into what FEMA envisioned the program to accomplish, with why it failed, and 
what can be gleaned from the process to inform future recommendations.  
xx 
B. FINDINGS 
The analysis for this thesis finds that FEMA’s national preparedness grants are 
allowing the nation to make slow but steady progress toward achieving the Goal of a secure 
and resilient nation. The following is a summary of the main findings from each of the four 
analysis chapters of this thesis.  
Chapter III provides an analysis of the 32 capabilities outlined in the Goal to 
determine if the nexus to terrorism associated with most of FEMA’s national preparedness 
grant programs impact the strategic intent of the Goal. The main takeaway from this 
analysis is that the nexus to terrorism required by most of the preparedness grant programs 
has minimal limitations on where grant recipients may want to invest their funds toward 
the achievement of the Goal. This limitation is primarily due to the majority of capabilities 
applying to all-hazards to include terrorism.  
Chapter IV examines the results of the NPR to determine how far the nation had 
progressed toward achieving the strategic intent of the Goal. An analysis of the NPRs from 
2014 to 2018 indicated that most of the core capabilities have had modest increases or are 
centralizing to Medium. Figure 1 displays the percentage of states that rated themselves 
high, medium or low for 2014 and 2018. However, this progress cannot be positively 
correlated with funding investments in capability, as some capabilities, such as operational 
communications, are centralized despite large investments. Capabilities associated with 
terrorism, have seen modest improvements but funding data from 2017 and 2018 indicate 





Figure 1.  Change in Percentage of States Rating themselves a 1–2, 3 
or 4–5 by Capability between 2014 and 2018.1 
Chapter V examines FEMA’s preparedness grants and how they could be adjusted 
to align better with the strategic intent of the Goal. The primary concerns highlighted in  
————————————— 
1 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 10; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2018 National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 11. 
xxii 
this chapter are the risks associated with declining appropriations and the limitations that 
the nexus to terrorism has on the ability of grant recipients to address all risks. Cuts in the 
annual amount of funding allocated to the programs are having many cascading effects 
including the loss or foreseeable loss of capability, increased spending in the Law 
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Activity (LETPA) area to maintain earlier funding 
levels, and inability to maintain expensive equipment purchased when the appropriation 
level was much higher. Another finding is that the language in the statute authorizing these 
programs creates some limitations in how the required nexus to terrorism can be applied 
when justifying grant funding investments.  
Chapter VI analyzes the proposed National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). 
FEMA made this attempt to reorganize and consolidate it preparedness grant programs to 
align with the strategic intent of the Goal upon its inception. The primary takeaway from 
this chapter is that FEMA envisioned that the best way to adjust the programs to achieve 
the Goal is the elimination of the nexus to terrorism and the consolidation of the programs 
to align better with the all-hazards focused Goal. Despite the intent, the NPGP ultimately 
failed due to the uncertainty expressed by Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) recipients 
regarding the loss of funding and the potential risks to the programs posed by the 
disassociation to terrorism.  
In sum, the culmination of this research reveals that the relationship between the 
national preparedness grant programs and the achievement of the Goal are for the most 
part, in alignment, but can be improved.  
C. RECOMMENDATION: CHANGE THE NEXUS FROM TERRORISM TO 
HOMELAND SECURITY OR SECURITY 
The language in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the Act) as Amended, is the 
reason programs, such as State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and UASI, have a 
nexus to terrorism. However, the Act also establishes the mission of the agency, which 
extends beyond terrorism into areas, such as all-hazards planning, economic security, civil  
 
xxiii 
rights and liberties, and drug trafficking.2 This recommendation proposes that the language 
in the Act and subsequent program guidance be changed to reflect a nexus to security or 
homeland security. The concept of security can be represented in sectors, as proposed by 
Malec, or through the lens of lifelines as utilized by FEMA. The language can also be 
amended to address a nexus to homeland security, which can be aligned under the 
definition proposed by Bellavita as it relates to FEMA’s 2018–2022 strategic plan. In either 
case, the amended language coincides with the spirit of the Act while eliminating the 
required nexus to a specific hazard. In turn, this adjustment will allow grant recipients the 
flexibility needed to ensure that their limited funding can be freely applied to their areas of 
greatest risk. This adjustment includes addressing the impacts of the opioid crisis, which 
are noted in Chapter V as being an area of risk that cannot be addressed through a nexus to 
terrorism. When considering the sectors of security, there is not one that the opioid crisis 
does not impact. 
This change may still require some legislative adjustments but not to the same 
extent if the programs were changed to address all-hazards, which can risk future 
appropriations as discussed earlier. Also, concerns have been raised that moving the focus 
of the programs from terrorism to security may impact investments being made in 
terrorism. However, the data in Chapter IV clearly indicates that most of the funding is 
already being directed toward capabilities not solely terrorism focused. Some risk is 
inherent in asking Congress to consider this change. Legislative changes require 
discussion, which can sometimes bring additional scrutiny and unpredictable results. 
However, the proposed changes do not take away from the focus on homeland security and 
the increased flexibility to align the grant programs with the achievement of the Goal 









The primary takeaway from the research for this thesis is that the FEMA’s 
preparedness grant programs and the Goal are mostly aligned. Nearly all the core 
capabilities outlined in the Goal apply to all-hazards, which allow the Goal to conform to 
the diversity of programs designed to address the risks faced by the state, local, tribal, and 
territorial jurisdictions that make up the nation. This flexibility has allowed grant recipients 
to increase their all-hazards preparedness even with investments requiring a nexus to 
terrorism.  
The advancements in capability have been slow but steady. Analysis in this thesis 
finds that most capabilities have increased or centralized (meaning that middle ratings are 
growing) between 2014 and 2018. More than half of the grant funds between 2017 and 
2018 were invested in the capabilities of planning, operational coordination, and 
operational communications.  
Congressional appropriations for FEMA grant programs predicated on 
preparedness have decreased. It is possible that capability will be lost if these 
appropriations decline further. However, an increase in the appropriations is unlikely 
unless FEMA can do a better job of showing Congress the eventual outcome of these 
investments and their impact on capability, which is beyond simply indicating the 
capabilities where investments are being made. A new system of measurement along with 
the loosening the required nexus to terrorism can allow grant recipients to align their 
investments better with risks and provide Congress with the justification needed to 
maintain or possibly increase the annual appropriations to FEMA’s preparedness grants. 
This mixture of funding and flexibility will ultimately lead to the achievement of the Goal. 
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Since its inception in 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
has been responsible for assisting state and local jurisdictions in mitigating, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from disasters. This assistance comes primarily in the form 
of grants. In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the 
creation of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) that was predicated on terrorism 
preparedness. In 2019, the HSGP has remained mostly unchanged and is still the highest 
funded of FEMA’s preparedness grant programs.  
In 2019, FEMA spent over three times the amount on the HSGP grants ($1.365 
billion) to prevent and respond to terrorism than the all-hazards Emergency Management 
Performance Grant (EMPG) ($350 million). When comparing the impacts of other hazards 
with those of terrorism, the United States spends much more responding to and recovering 
from other hazards. Since 1970, the cost of recovering from terrorism in the United States 
has been $224 billion, which includes the nearly $200 billion spent to recover from 9/11.1 
In 2017 alone, the cost to recovery from natural disasters was $306.2 billion.2 Emergency 
management specialists have argued that when too much attention is paid to terrorism, it 
can impact preparedness efforts tailored toward other hazards.3 The failures of Hurricane 
Katrina have also fed the narrative that too large a focus on terrorism can erode the 
preparedness level for natural disasters.4  
In his book, Beyond the Storms, Dane Egli suggests that the United States should 
take an all-hazards approach to homeland security that crosses all threat and geographic 
domains to ensure a wide-ranging approach to the planning and execution of national 
 
1 John E. Mueller, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
2 Adam B. Smith, “2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: A Historic Year in 
Context,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, January 8, 2018, 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-
disasters-historic-year. 
3 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What Is Homeland Security?” Homeland 
Security Affairs IV, no. 2 (June 2008), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/118. 
4 Bellavita. 
2 
strategies.5 Such an approach, Egli explains, strengthens homeland security and emergency 
management, as well as promotes resilience to any hazard. The prioritization of 
preparedness efforts to address the hazards of greatest concern will position a jurisdiction 
to handle events less likely to occur.6 In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), along with FEMA did just that through the introduction of the National 
Preparedness Goal (the Goal). The Goal marked a break from a solely terrorism focus in 
the wake of the September 11, 2001 by implementing legislative requirements from both 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) and Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 (PPD8).7  
The strategic intent of the Goal is to establish a “secure and resilient Nation with 
the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”8 In June 
2018, FEMA established the Office of Resilience as an umbrella organization for FEMA 
missions including mitigation, insurance, preparedness, grants, and continuity. The 2017 
National Security Strategy defines resilience as “the ability to withstand and recover 
rapidly from deliberate attacks, accidents, natural disasters, as well as unconventional 
stresses, shocks, and threats to our economy and democratic system.”9 When communities 
achieve resiliency, the impact of a disaster on life, property, and the environment is 
significantly minimized. Resiliency shortens the time needed to recover from disasters 
because individuals, businesses, and essential services are restored more quickly.10 The 
 
5 Dane S. Egli, Beyond the Storms: Strengthening Homeland Security and Disaster Management to 
Achieve Resilience (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2014). 
6 Bellavita, 8. 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 1. 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd. ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 1. 
9 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 1, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
10 “What Is Community Resilience?,” Community & Regional Resilience Institute, accessed July 6, 
2019, http://www.resilientus.org/. 
3 
catastrophic disasters of 2017 and 2018 highlighted the need for states and local 
communities to be more resilient to facilitate faster infrastructure and economic recovery.  
A 2011 report from the Homeland Security Advisory Committee Community 
Resilience Task Force presents findings and recommendations for how the agency can 
better promote community resilience. In the report, the council asserts that if the grants that 
make up the HSGP are centered more on resilience, local communities can then better 
refine their efforts toward preparedness, which in turn, allows resilience to be more 
measurable at the national level.11 Given that this system of measurement has been 
implemented through the 32 core capabilities outlined in the Goal, FEMA should also look 
for ways that the HSGP can be better aligned with the strategic intent of the Goal. As of 
2019, FEMA’s preparedness programs remain predominantly focused on terrorism. 
The primary objective of this research is to discover how the FEMA national 
preparedness grant programs can be improved to facilitate the strategic intent of the Goal 
better. It examines progress on the 32 capabilities that comprise the Goal, how the nexus 
to terrorism required by most FEMA preparedness grants may be influencing progress on 
these capabilities, and which capabilities have recently received the most funding. It also 
examines legislation, congressional authorizations, and appropriations to understand 
adjustments have been made to align these programs better with the strategic intent of the 
Goal. FEMA’s failed attempt to change legislation is also considered in developing future 
recommendations.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is intended to examine materials regarding the strategic intent 
of the Goal in establishing a secure and resilient nation. The Goal and its 32 core 
capabilities provide the nation a means to measure preparedness levels in the endeavor 
towards improving security and resilience. The first section looks at why resilience is 
necessary, how resilience is achieved at the community level, and how resilience and 
security interrelate. The second section reviews security specifically and the various sectors 
 
11 Homeland Security Advisory Committee, Homeland Security Advisory Committee-Community 
Resilience Task Force Recommendations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 28. 
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that fall within its purview. The third section examines the umbrella of homeland security 
and the definition of this term. The final section covers the difficulties associated with 
measuring preparedness, and compares and contrasts preparedness for all-hazards and 
preparedness for terrorism. Additionally, the national impacts from natural disasters and 
terrorism are considered.  
1. Establishing the Need for Resilience 
President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy called for the government to 
focus on helping Americans to continue to be resilient.12 One aspect mentioned as part of 
this initiative is the use of risk-informed investments to reduce risk and build more resilient 
communities. The National Security Strategy defines resilience as “the ability to withstand 
and recover rapidly from deliberate attacks, accidents, natural disasters, as well as 
unconventional stresses, shocks, and threats to our economy and democratic system.”13 
When communities improve resiliency, the impact of a disaster on life, property, and the 
environment is significantly minimized. Resiliency shortens the time needed to recover 
from disasters because individuals, businesses, and essential services are restored more 
quickly. The sentiments established in this document regarding community resilience were 
validated by the 2017 hurricanes and fires that caused billions in damage from Puerto Rico 
to California. In a 2018 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Economic 
Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, FEMA Associate 
Administrator, Jeffrey Byard, testified on the state, local, tribal and territorial government’s 
recovery from the catastrophic disasters that occurred in 2017. He stated, “If these 
governments are well resourced, well trained, and well organized, the effectiveness of 
FEMA’s assistance is enhanced.”14 In March 2018, FEMA administrator Brock Long 
introduced the 2018–2022 FEMA Strategic Plan, which included the goal of “build[ing] a 
 
12 Trump, National Security Strategy, 16. 
13 Trump, 14. 
14 Lou Barletta, Are We Ready? Recovering from 2017 Disasters and Preparing for the 2018 
Hurricane Season (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 3. 
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culture of preparedness.”15 The plan states, “Disaster resiliency is the backbone of 
emergency management and the foundation for the FEMA mission. The most successful 
way to achieve disaster resiliency is to create a culture of preparedness across America.”16  
2. Resilience Begins at the Local Level 
FEMA began its 2018 journey into the realm of resilience by asking each individual 
to join the organization in building a new culture of preparedness. This appeal is indicative 
of resilience as a bottom-up concept. A resilient nation cannot be achieved without first 
achieving disaster preparedness at the local community level. In the book, Disaster 
Resilience: A National Imperative, Susan Cutter et al. describe six components necessary 
to change the culture of national preparedness:  
• Taking responsibility for disaster risk.  
• Addressing the challenge of establishing the core value of resilience in 
communities, including the use of disaster loss data to foster long-term 
commitments to enhancing resilience.  
• Developing and deploying tools or metrics for monitoring progress toward 
resilience.  
• Building local, community capacity because decisions and the ultimate 
resilience of a community are driven from the bottom up.  
• Understanding the landscape of government policies and practices to help 
communities increase resilience.  
• Identifying and communicating the roles and responsibilities of 
communities and all levels of government in building resilience.17 
 
15 Brock Long, 2018–2022 FEMA Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2018), 12. 
16 Long, 12. 
17 Susan L. Cutter et al., Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative (Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2012), 2, https://doi.org/10.17226/13457. 
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These six components, designed to achieve resilience at the local level, are 
inherently preparedness related. No funding mechanism is currently available specifically 
designed around promoting preparedness or resilience at the local level. If it did exist, what 
would it look like? How would a community know when it has achieved resilience? Could 
resilience even be measured? All these questions would need answering before any funding 
mechanism for the aforementioned purpose could be considered. FEMA’s preparedness 
grant programs were moved under the purview of resilience in 2018. The next section 
examines how concepts of resilience and security associated with the achievement of the 
Goal fit together. 
3. What Is Security? 
In a thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School titled “Security Perception within 
and beyond the Traditional Approach,” Mieczslaw Malec attempts to define the vast arena 
of security. To understand the realm of security better, Malec breaks security down into 
sectors. Malec suggests that categorizing security in sectors has three distinct advantages 
because it describes the security environment as a whole, organizes the threats, and leaves 
room to add emerging sectors.18 Malec groups security into eight sectors: political, 
military, economic, societal, environmental, human, technological, and terrorism. 
Malec goes on to describe these sectors individually. All security threats have 
political underpinnings that may impact state sovereignty.19 Political security can be 
threatened both internally against the government legitimacy and externally from outside 
forces.20 Military security has a direct impact on political security and involves the ability 
of governments to sustain themselves militarily both internally and externally but also 
against non-military threats.21 Economic security is the second pillar of political security 
and involves all aspects of a nation’s economic structure.22 Societal security involves the 
 
18 Mieczyslaw Malec, “Security Perception: Within and beyond the Traditional Approach” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 31. 
19 Malec, 32. 
20 Malec, 33. 
21 Malec, 34. 
22 Malec, 37. 
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stability of the state organizational structure, government, and ideology that work together 
to legitimacy and identity.23 Environmental security is a broad area that covers issues 
ranging from scarcity of resources, degradation of natural resources, climate change, 
migration, and population growth.24 The sector of human security is expansive and lacks a 
clear definition. This sector covers the whole gamut of the human experience from the 
standpoint of physical security to psychological wellness.25 Technological security is an 
ever-changing environment that includes the threats associated with cybersecurity but also 
considers the impacts of emerging technologies.26 Security from terrorism is given its own 
sector due to its asymmetric nature and the concepts surrounding the prevention of 
terrorism that separate it from other threats.27 
The briefly described aforementioned security sectors are all interrelated and 
represent the whole of the security environment. Given the vastness of the security 
environment, these sectors provide a process of identifying areas of focus. Dividing the 
environment allows a mechanism for assessing each sector to determine the health of the 
whole more easily. It also provides a means of identifying gaps for the direction of 
resources and funding.  
In similar fashion, FEMA devised its Community Lifelines to break security into 
sectors to provide a means to identify gaps in the wake of a disaster and direct the flow of 
resources and funding. FEMA defines a lifeline as something that “enables the continuous 
operation of critical government and business functions and is essential to human health 
and safety or economic security.”28 The seven lifelines consist of safety and security, food, 
water and shelter, health and medical, energy, communications, transportation, and 
 
23 Malec, 38. 
24 Malec, 42. 
25 Malec, 44. 
26 Malec, 46. 
27 Malec, 52. 
28 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Community Lifelines Implementation Toolkit 2.0 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 9. 
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hazardous materials.29 As with the sectors delineated by Malec, these lifelines represent 
the whole of the security environment surrounding disasters regardless of hazard. 
4. Homeland Security 
Since the establishment of DHS in 2002, the nation has struggled to define the 
concept of homeland security. Although the agency was formed in the wake of 9/11, the 
umbrella of homeland security covers much more than terrorism. In a journal article for 
Homeland Security Affairs, Chris Bellevita addresses this problem. Bellavita asserts that 
homeland security has at least seven definitions.30 In his paper, Bellavita considers 
homeland security in the context of these definitions. These definitions include homeland 
security as it relates to, “(1) terrorism, (2) all-hazards, (3) terrorism and catastrophes, (4) 
jurisdictional hazards, (5) meta hazards, (6) national security, and (7) government efforts 
to curtail civil liberties.”31 In a poll of homeland security practitioners, Bellavita’s article 
reveals that more than a third feel that homeland security is a mixed or undefined discipline, 
while another third see homeland security through the lens of all-hazards or terrorism.32 In 
the end, Bellavita finds that the definitions he discussed are constructed using a “coherence 
view of truth.”33 Inevitably, what a particular person believes to be homeland security, 
given the lack of a solid definition, is the truth. 
A review of FEMA’s strategic plan and the guidance documents for the 
preparedness grant programs lean toward the “terrorism and catastrophes” definition 
provided by Bellavita. The notice of funding opportunity for the 2019 HSGP states that the 
objective of the grant is to “provide funds to eligible entities to support state, local, tribal, 
and territorial efforts to prevent terrorism and other catastrophic events and to prepare the 
Nation for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United 
 
29 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2. 
30 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” 1. 
31 Bellavita, 2. 
32 Bellavita, 21. 
33 Bellavita, 21. 
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States.”34 Goal #2 in FEMA’s 2018–2022 Strategic Plan is to “ready the nation for 
catastrophic disasters.”35 In this context, Bellavita suggests defining homeland security 
“what the Department of Homeland Security—supported by other federal agencies—does 
to prevent, respond to and recover from terrorist and catastrophic events that affect the 
security of the United States.”36 
5. Resilience and Security 
The increase of resiliency at the local level will inherently increase security. Tim 
Prior and Florian Roth make this case in their article, “Disaster, Resilience and Security in 
Global Cities published in the Journal of Strategic Security.” They assert that the bottom-
up structure associated with local resilience is useful for both managing disasters and 
maintaining security.37 The Goal also suggests that these concepts are interrelated through 
the 32 core capabilities. It states, “We describe our security and resilience posture through 
the core capabilities that are necessary to deal with the risks we face and each community 
contributes to the Goal by individually preparing for the risks that are most relevant and 
urgent for them individually.”38 Given the interrelation of resilience and security, it is 
imperative that FEMA preparedness funding allow for communities to address their 
specific risks whether they are posed from terrorism or natural disasters. The next issue is 
homeland security and its applicability to national preparedness through the lens of FEMA. 
6. Measuring Preparedness 
Much has been written about the difficulties associated with measuring 
preparedness at any level. Brian A. Jackson of the RAND Corporation wrote a paper in 
2008 outlining the preparedness challenges facing the Obama administration regarding 
measuring preparedness. Jackson asserts that it has long been the national policy to 
 
34 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 HSGP Notice of Funding Opportunity 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019), 2. 
35 Long, 2018–2022 FEMA Strategic Plan, 20. 
36 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” 5. 
37 Tim Prior and Florian Roth, “Disaster, Resilience and Security in Global Cities,” Journal of 
Strategic Security; San Jose 6, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 68, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.5. 
38 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 2. 
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measure preparedness by reacting to the shortfalls of the last major response.39 Jackson 
goes further to suggest that preparedness should be measured with a system of 
organizations, capabilities, and resources based on pre-established performance metrics.40 
The National Preparedness System (NPS) is supposed to operate in this manner. Along the 
same lines, Glen Woodbury penned an article in 2005 discussing the complexities of 
assessing the prevention of terrorism. Woodbury contends that as a nation, people cannot 
simply assume that terrorist attacks have been prevented due to intelligence victories or by 
the massive amounts of funding that have been thrown at the problem.41 Woodbury 
proposed the concept of establishing desired outcomes and outputs into capability targets.42 
This concept, as was the case with the aforementioned Jackson, is a precursor to what  
is now a critical component of the NPS. With a preparedness measuring system in place, 
the discussion turns to where the nation faces its most prominent risk: terrorism or  
natural disasters. 
7. Terrorism and Natural Disasters 
Terrorism has become a household word in the United States since the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. According to the Global Terrorism Database, 2,900 terror attacks in 
the United States have occurred from 1970 through 2017.43 Mueller and Stewart calculate 
the cost per attack as approximately $10 million, excluding the attacks on 9/11.44 Their 
calculations bring the total costs of terrorism in the United States since 1970 to $29 billion. 
If the costs of 9/11 are added to this figure, the tally becomes $224 billion.45 This number 
 
39 Brian A. Jackson, The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing 
‘“Response Reliability,”’ as Part of Homeland Security Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), vii. 
40 Jackson, viii. 
41 Glen Woodbury, “Measuring Prevention,” Homeland Security Affairs; Monterey 1, no. 1 (Summer 
2005), Proquest. 
42 Woodbury. 
43 “Global Terrorism Database,” University of Maryland, December 2017, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=injuries&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&co
untry=217&count=100. 
44 Mueller, Chasing Ghosts, 276. 
45 Mueller, 276. 
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is less than the cumulative costs from natural disasters of $306.2 billion in just 2017.46 For 
terrorism, this number equates to an average annual cost of $5 billion per year (including 
the 9/11 statistics) or $617 million per year (excluding 9/11). In the case of natural 
disasters, if just the disasters costing over $1 billion since 1980 through 2018 are 
considered, the cost per year is $42 billion.47  
Based on these numbers, it is clear that the costs of natural disasters far outweigh 
those of terrorism to the tune of eight to one even when including the anomaly of 9/11. 
This being the case, the question is why FEMA’s non-disaster preparedness grant programs 
spend just over three to one on terrorism preparedness when comparing the terrorism 
related HSGP to the all-hazards EMPG. Despite the terrorism focus, FEMA’s 2018 
National Preparedness Report (NPR) identifies five core capabilities that are of greatest 
concern regarding preparedness.48 These capabilities include operational coordination, 
infrastructure systems, housing, economic recovery, and cybersecurity.49 Of the five, only 
cybersecurity is a specifically human-caused threat. Otherwise, these capabilities are 
attributable to the response and recovery from all-hazards including terrorism. 
8. All-Hazards Preparedness and Terrorism 
One area of consistent contention is whether the hazard of terrorism exists within 
or outside the all-hazards environment. Zhuang and Bier pose that terrorism exists outside 
all-hazards because of the ability of attackers to adapt their tactics based on the 
implementation of protection mechanisms.50 On the other hand, Bellavita asserts that it 
could be argued that many capabilities necessary to handle most hazards would also be 
 
46 Smith, “2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters.” 
47 “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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48 “Homeland Security Grant Program,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last updated 
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49 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 2. 
50 Jun Zhuang and Vicki M. Bier, “Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy 
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needed for a response to a terrorist incident.51 Bellavita also notes that it is neither cost-
effective nor realistic for communities to narrow their preparedness efforts specifically to 
terrorism.52  
According to Mark Sauter, “The U.S. government defines homeland security as the 
domestic effort to defend America from terrorists. In practice, homeland security efforts 
have also come to comprise general preparedness under the all-hazards doctrine.”53 It is 
problematic to take too narrow an approach to the variety of risks faced as a nation. As Egli 
explains, “We must establish a more functional resilience approach that focuses more on 
how to prioritize hazard mitigation, respond to disasters and recover services than trying 
to prevent an irregular threat that is unavoidable and unpredictable.”54 A plethora of natural 
disasters has occurred since 9/11.  
9. Summary 
This review establishes that resilience is achieved by providing local communities 
with the resources needed to prepare for the threats and hazards they face. It also asserts 
that security can be defined by its many interrelated sectors and that a direct relationship 
exists between resilience and security. Security in the context of homeland security has 
multiple definitions. However, a review of FEMA’s guidance documents provided a 
purview of what homeland security means in the context of delivering its programs. This 
meaning is essentially that homeland security is contingent on terrorism preparedness. It is 
very difficult to measure preparedness levels in relation to the perceived risks. The Goal 
provides a system that may not be perfect, but it does provide a uniform, all-hazards system 
that can be applied to measure each state’s preparedness levels despite inherent differences. 
A significant difference exists in the risks and impacts derived from natural hazards versus 
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the threat of terrorism. Yet, the majority of funds granted by FEMA towards national 
preparedness remain focused on the threat posed by terrorism.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the FEMA national preparedness grant programs be improved to facilitate 
the strategic intent of the Goal better? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Goal was published in September 2011 as a system of measurement designed 
to gauge national preparedness as required by PPD8. The Goal is to establish “a secure and 
resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the 
greatest risk.”55 The Goal establishes the 32 core capabilities (see the Appendix) under the 
mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery intended to be 
built and/or sustained to reach the Goal.56 Since 2011, one of the primary vehicles to 
accomplishing the Goal is preparedness grants administered through FEMA. It has been 
nearly 10 years since the inception of the Goal. These following sub-questions are designed 
to help determine if FEMA’s preparedness grants are optimally structured to facilitate the 
strategic intent of the Goal. 
1. Sub-question 1 
• How does the nexus to terrorism associated with most of FEMA’s national 
preparedness grant programs impact the strategic intent of the Goal? 
The Goal provides a uniform process with which any jurisdictions can measure 
their level of capability to handle their specific hazards of concern. FEMA’s preparedness 
grants are intended to assist state and local communities to build or sustain their 
capabilities. However, most FEMA’s preparedness grants require that funded projects have 
a nexus to terrorism preparedness. For projects to be funded through these programs, 
 
55 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
56 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
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recipients must first demonstrate how the project supports terrorism preparedness and 
explain how the project will prevent a threatened or an actual act of terrorism.57 The 
research for this first part involves an analysis of the 32 core capabilities that make up the 
Goal to determine what capabilities are specific to terrorism and those that can be attributed 
to all-hazards. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the nexus to terrorism creates 
limitations on grant funds to address all 32 core capabilities. Part of this analysis considers 
the capabilities through the lens of terrorism preparedness and all-hazards preparedness to 
identify any gaps that lie between the two. The identification of potential gaps along with 
the analysis of the capabilities provides an overall assessment of the effectiveness of a 
nexus to terrorism on the nation’s ability to achieve the Goal  
2. Sub-question 2 
• What do the results of the NPR indicate about achieving the strategic 
intent of the Goal? 
The strategic intent of FEMA’s national preparedness grants is based on the 
building or maintaining of the 32 capabilities outlined in the Goal.  
The second step of the research analyzes the national preparedness reports from 
2013 to present to determine if capability has increased, and if so, in what areas. This data 
should, in turn, be reflective of the impact funding investments have had over time. This 
report is the annual culmination of state submitted Stakeholder Preparedness Reviews 
(SPR) that provide a numeric measurement (on a scale of 1–5) on the state’s preparedness 
level through the lens of the 32 core capabilities within the elements of planning, 
organization, equipment, training and exercises outlined in the Goal. These reports provide 
overarching findings that will indicate what capabilities have been built upon or sustained, 
where capability has been lost and what capabilities have remained weak. This research 
specifically examines the percentage of states that rate themselves a 1–2, 3 or 4–5 and how 
 
57 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 HSGP Notice of Funding Opportunity, 
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this percentage has changed from the results of the 2013 NPR to the most current 2018 
iteration.  
3. Sub-question 3 
• Can FEMA’s preparedness grants be adjusted to align with the strategic 
intent of the Goal? 
The introduction of the Goal in 2011 has changed the way the nation measures its 
level of preparedness. Most of FEMA’s current preparedness grants were established after 
9/11. For a grant to come into existence, the U.S. Congress has to create a law authorizing 
the program. These authorizations contain language that informs the subsequent guidance 
that tells recipients what the program is designed to accomplish and what activities are 
eligible. This research involves an examination of the language within the statutes that 
originally authorized the preparedness grants along with the original grant guidance. These 
original documents are then compared with subsequent authorizations and guidance to 
determine if Congress made any changes to these statutes that may allow the grant to be 
adjusted to align with the Goal. 
In addition to the authorization that must be made to institute a grant program, 
Congress must also appropriate funds annually to finance the programs. These 
appropriations are indicative of the perceived value and prioritization of the programs in 
Congress. The next step for Question 3 is to analyze the appropriation levels since the 
inception of the Goal to ascertain how or if funding levels have changed over time. This 
aspect, coupled with findings from the NPR in Sub-Question 2, may establish a linkage 
between the level of appropriation and the progress made toward building capability since 
2013. To understand the value of these grant programs fully, the return on investment must 
also be considered. The return on investment will indicate the benefits the nation is 
receiving in relation to the appropriations discussed previously. The process of calculating 
return on investment can simply be based on the value of cost share where a recipient of 
federal funds is required to match the federal amount with non-federal funds. More 
complex calculations also involve the value of the items purchased with the grant funds by 
the ongoing benefit they provide to the recipient, their regional partners, or the nation. The 
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research for these calculations involves locating documents that denote the return on 
investment for the respective grant program. This research, coupled with the history of 
congressional appropriations, provides an overall picture of the strengths and weaknesses 
of FEMA’s preparedness grants as they relate to the achievement of the Goal. 
4. Sub-question 4 
• What can be learned from FEMA’s attempt to consolidate the national 
preparedness grants with regard to achieving the strategic intent of the 
Goal? 
Between 2012 and 2014, FEMA attempted to consolidate its national preparedness 
grants into one program call the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). The intent 
of this consolidation was to align the preparedness grant programs better with the Goal.58 
Although Congress never enacted this proposed program, it does provide a historical record 
of FEMA’s attempt to try to align the national preparedness grants to the Goal. The research 
for this section is centered on understanding the intent of the program and how the current 
grant recipients perceived that the program impacts their preparedness. This 
comprehension will provide an understanding of if and where the NPGP fell short and 
inform potential recommendations derived from the other three sub-questions described 
previously. This analysis includes the review of congressional hearings on the program and 
vision documents published by FEMA. These vision documents provide FEMA 
leadership’s intent for the program and purposes for consolidation. This information is used 
to consider how one consolidated program may impact national preparedness. The 
congressional hearings provide an overview of how and if the FEMA leader’s intent 
changed over the course of three years to facilitate the adoption of the policy. In addition, 
the congressional hearings also show arguments for and against the new policy. The 
analysis of these hearings provides a better understanding of what the arguments are for 
and against the new policy.  
 
58 Department of Homeland Security, FY2013 National Preparedness Grant Program Vision 
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The outcome of this research is an overall analysis of FEMA’s preparedness grant 
programs to determine if they are meeting the strategic intent of the Goal to deliver the 32 
core capabilities and facilitate a more resilient nation.  
D. THESIS ROADMAP 
Chapter II provides background information on the two common denominators of 
the thesis, the Goal and the NPGPs. This background is designed to help the reader 
understand how the system works regarding measuring the nation’s capability as it relates 
to the Goal. It also provides an overview of the grant programs centered on building the 
nation’s preparedness capabilities. 
Chapter III analyzes the 32 core capabilities, their definitions, and if the capability 
addresses just terrorism or all-hazards to include terrorism. This chapter also considers the 
benefits and limitations of a terrorism focused preparedness approach.  
Chapter IV provides the reader an overview of the NPR, which is an annual 
publication that discusses where the nation is in the quest to reach the Goal. This chapter 
also analyzes the results of the NPR since the inception of the Goal to determine what 
progress has been made. Additionally, this chapter examines which capabilities are 
receiving the most grant funds to show how these investments relate to the progress that 
has been made toward achieving the Goal. 
Chapter V provides a historical purview of the national preparedness grant 
programs. It looks at the evolution of the statutes that authorize the programs and how the 
programmatic guidance has changed since their inception. The chapter also examines how 
Congress has appropriated funds to the programs since their inception. These two issues 
are evaluated further to determine the impacts they have had on the effectiveness of the 
programs and their relationship to the achievement of the Goal. In addition, the return on 
investment is considered for the more prominent programs to determine the benefits 
received versus the funds appropriated to the programs over time. 
Chapter VI examines FEMA’s intent behind the proposed NPGP and how the 
proposed program may have impacted the achievement of the Goal. The chapter also 
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discusses the support and opposition to the legislation, why it ultimately failed, and how it 
may help formulate a way forward. 
Chapter VII is a conclusion intended to summarize the findings in the previous 
chapters and provide a transition to the author’s concluding thoughts and recommendations 




The background chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the Goal and an 
introduction to the grant programs FEMA provides to address preparedness. The discussion 
on the Goal explains the mission areas and capabilities that are the essence of the Goal. 
Additionally, this section exhibits how the states go about measuring their ability to achieve 
the Goal. The next section outlines FEMAs preparedness grants to include a brief 
description of their purpose and their current funding levels. The basic information 
provided allows the reader to have a base understanding of these two areas, which help 
synthesize the chapters to come. 
B. NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 
The first edition of the Goal was released in September 2011 as the goal of the NPS 
required by PPD 8. The Goal states that its strategic intent is to establish a “secure and 
resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the 
greatest risk.”59 The Goal outlines the 32 core capabilities that must be addressed to achieve 
the goal. These capabilities are listed in Figure 1. The first edition had 31 core capabilities. 
When the 2nd edition was released, two capabilities were added, fire management and 
suppression, and logistics and supply chain management. The capabilities of public health 
and medical services, and public and private services and resources were combined into 
one capability under public health, healthcare, and emergency medical services. Through 
the 32 core capabilities, the Goal is accomplished by: 
• Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of 
terrorism. 
 
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
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• Protecting this nation’s citizens, residents, visitors, assets, systems, and 
networks against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows 
U.S. interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive. 
• Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future 
disasters. 
• Responding quickly to save lives, protect property, and the environment, 
and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of an incident. 
• Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening, and 
revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and the economy, as well as the 
health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities 
affected by an incident.60 
States are required to conduct an annual assessment of their capabilities. The 
assessment process shown in Figure 1 begins with the state completing the Threat/Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). Each state identifies threats and hazards of 
concern and then adds context to the hazards by developing a scenario depicting how each 
hazard may impact its jurisdiction. 
 
60 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
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Figure 1. Mission Areas and Core Capabilities.61 
From these contextualized events, the state develops a list of impacts that each 
hazard may have through the lens of each relevant capability. The end result of the THIRA 
process (shown in Figure 2) is the development of capability targets for each of the 32 core 
capabilities.  
 
61 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3. 
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Figure 2. THIRA Process.62 
These targets are established by taking the worst impact associated with each 
capability and coupling it with a timeframe metric. The capability target provides the state 
a benchmark for determining resource needs and identifying shortfalls. The THIRA 
process is designed around whole community involvement. The more involvement in the 
process, the less subjective the outcome is.  
Armed with 32 targets for each of the core capabilities, the state uses these targets 
as the basis for the next part of the risk assessment or that of the SPR. The SPR process 
pictured in Figure 3 involves the state rating itself numerically from 1–5 based on the 
elements of planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises as they relate to 
reaching the capability target for each of the 32 core capabilities. If the state rates the 
capability less than 5, it needs to identify resource gaps between its current rating and a 
fully matured capability. The state also designates whether the capability is low, medium, 
or high priority.  
 
62 Source: Department of Homeland Security, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 11. 
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Figure 3. SPR Process.63 
The THIRA and SPR are submitted to FEMA annually. The data from these 
assessments is used for two purposes. The first is to develop the NPR, which is an 
aggregation of data from all the state submitted SPRs and provides an overall purview of 
preparedness at a national level. Second, the states submit applications for annual grant 
funding, which requires that the states tie their investment justifications to the building  
or sustainment of the specific core capabilities or addressing resource gaps identified in  
the SPR. 
C. FEMA’S NON-DISASTER PREPAREDNESS GRANT PROGRAMS 
The HSGP is the centerpiece of FEMA’s non-disaster preparedness grant programs. 
This program is appropriated annually by Congress and is always the highest funded of the 
preparedness grant programs. For federal fiscal year (FY) 2019, the HSGP was funded at 
nearly $1.1 billion.64 It consists of three programs: the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and Operation Stonegarden (OSG). 
All three programs are tied directly to the nexus of terrorism preparedness. The SHSP is 
awarded annually to states and territories based on population.65 The UASI is awarded 
annually to urban areas based on population and a risk assessment that is required as part 
of the application process.66 The OSG is awarded to select border states for the use of 
terrorism preparedness pertaining to border crossings.67 The SHSP and UASI also go to 
 
63 Source: Department of Homeland Security, 23. 
64 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Homeland Security Grant Program.” 
65 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 HSGP Notice of Funding Opportunity. 
66 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
67 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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fund state and regional intelligence fusion centers and law enforcement terrorism 
prevention activities (LETPA).68 The SHSP requires that 80 percent of the funding be 
passed through to local units of government. 
The next highest funded preparedness grant program in FY 2019 was the EMPG at 
$350 million.69 The EMPG is an all-hazards program awarded to states based on population 
to sustain their emergency management programs. One of the unique characteristics that 
distinguishes EMPG from the other preparedness programs is its authorizing statutes.  
The more well-known of these is the Stafford Act and the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act.70 As opposed to HSGP and all its components administered by 
FEMA headquarters, the EMPG is administered by FEMA’s 10 regional offices. The 
guidance for the EMPG provides significant flexibility to states to allow the program to 
meet their specific and variable needs. The program allows the states to sub-grant funds to 
their local jurisdictions to sustain emergency management capabilities at the county or 
local level.  
The final six programs were collectively funded for FY 2019 at $270 million. They 
are all centered on terrorism preparedness and tailored to a more focused group of 
recipients. These six programs include the Intercity Bus Security Grant, Intercity Passenger 
Rail Security Grant, Non-Profit Security Grant, Port Security Grant, Transit Security Grant, 
and Tribal Homeland Security Grant.71  
The aforementioned programs listed make up the entirety of FEMA’s non-disaster 
preparedness grant catalog. In sum, $1.4 billion is tied directly to the nexus of terrorism 
and $350 million to all-hazards preparedness through EMPG.72 The purpose of this thesis 
is to examine these programs to determine whether this configuration is facilitating the 
strategic intent of the Goal.  
 
68 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
69 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FY2019 EMPG Notice of Funding Opportunity 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019). 
70 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
71 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Homeland Security Grant Program.” 
72 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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III. TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS OR 
PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most common questions posed when the subject of the all-hazards 
approach is raised is how the threat of terrorism fits in. It is often claimed that preparing 
for any disaster encompasses preparedness for the hazards of terrorism.73 However, others 
claim it works the other way around.74 The premise behind the development of a NPS was 
to establish a measurable, balanced and prioritized approach to assessing risk and 
estimating resource requirements to prevent, respond to, and recover from the threats 
associated with terrorism and natural hazards.75 The Goal is designed to address all-
hazards, yet FEMA’s preparedness grants are predominantly centered on preparing for 
terrorism. The concept of terrorism preparedness was part of FEMA’s planning mission 
well before the attacks on 9/11.76 The attacks on 9/11 and the advent of DHS changed the 
emphasis placed on that part of FEMA’s mission. The prevalent occurrence of natural 
disasters coupled with the fact that another major terrorist attack has not occurred since 
9/11, accentuates the importance of taking an all-hazards approach that includes but is not 
predominantly focused on the threat of terrorism.  
This chapter examines the relationship between these programs and the Goal to 
determine if the nexus to terrorism preparedness impacts the nation’s ability to achieve the 
Goal. This chapter begins with the analysis of the mission areas that make up the Goal. 
This analysis examines the mission areas and their relationship between all-hazards and 
terrorism, and their applicability before and after an incident. The next section assesses the 
32 core capabilities outlined in the goal and whether they are applicable specifically to 
 
73 Glen Woodbury, Emergency Management in Higher Education: Current Practices and Conversations 
(Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2008), 45. 
74 Woodbury, 45. 
75 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness System (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011), 1. 
76 Egli, Beyond the Storms, 35. 
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terrorism or all-hazards. This research is executed by reviewing the capability definitions 
derived from the Goal to determine the applicability. The chapter concludes with an overall 
discussion on the findings from the previous sections to explain how or if the nexus to 
terrorism required by FEMA’s preparedness grants impacts the nation’s ability to achieve 
the Goal. 
B. THE MISSION AREAS 
Prior to addressing the capabilities, it must be understood how the mission areas fit 
within the context of national preparedness. Figure 4 provides a visualization of how these 
mission areas interrelate. This figure was adapted from an article written by Glen 
Woodbury that examined the gray area between emergency management and homeland 
security. The horizontal line in Figure 4 separates the pre-disaster mission areas from those 
applicable after an incident occurs. The vertical line in Figure 4 separates the mission areas 
specific to terrorism from those that address all-hazards.  
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Figure 4. Interrelation of Mission Areas in National Preparedness.77 
1. Prevention 
The mission area of prevention resides in a quadrant by itself in Figure 4. The Goal 
associates this mission area specifically with the prevention of an act of terror.78 The very 
nature of prevention, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as the act of preventing, a 
hindrance or obstruction lends itself to being an action that takes place prior to an 
incident.79 Although prevention does not happen after an incident, it does intersect with the 
area of protection. 
2. Protection 
The mission area of protection is the only area that intersects with three other 
mission areas and resides in all four quadrants. The mission areas of prevention and 
 
77 Adapted from Woodbury, Emergency Management in Higher Education, 47. Figure adapted from 
Woodbury’s graphic delineating the relationship between terrorism and all-hazards in the context of 
preparedness. 
78 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 1. 
79 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “prevention,” accessed September 26, 2020, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/prevention. 
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protection share capabilities as they relate to protection from terrorism. Although 
protection does not share capabilities with mitigation or response, but it does have 
capabilities that relate to both areas. For example, access control and identity verification 
plays a role both before a disaster and during the response phase. In the case of mitigation, 
the capability of physical protective measures has some components of mitigation to it 
when considering its applicability to critical infrastructure.  
3. Mitigation 
In Figure 4, the mission area of mitigation is applicable prior to a disaster occurring. 
Although mitigation is mostly applicable to natural hazards, components, as discussed in 
the protection section, can be associated with terrorism. In many cases, the mitigation 
capabilities are applied in the wake of a disaster response, but these actions are taken to 
make the community more resilient to future events. 
4. Response 
The mission area of response comes in to play after a disaster has occurred that 
places it below the horizontal line in Figure 4. However, it resides on both sides of the 
vertical line delineating its applicability to all-hazards including terrorism. Although they 
do not share capabilities, a definite relationship to the protection capability exists, as 
described previously. It is said that recovery begins in conjunction with response. However, 
they only share one capability, or that of infrastructure systems. 
5. Recovery 
The recovery mission area falls well below the horizontal line in Figure 5 given that 
a disaster must occur before something occurs from which to recover. The relationship 
between recovery and response is discussed in the response section. It can be said that the 
recovery mission area also relates back to prevention and mitigation. This relationship 
would likely be determined by whether the recovery was from a terror attack or a natural 
disaster due to the cyclical nature of emergency management. In the next section, each 
mission area is revisited but with the emphasis on the capabilities within each area. 
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C. THE CORE CAPABILITIES 
In the following sections, each capability is briefly analyzed to determine its 
applicability to terrorism specifically or to the full spectrum of hazards. This analysis is 
done primarily through the examination of the capability definitions outlined in the Goal 
and the context of the mission area within which that the capability resides. The following 
tables provide a snapshot of the capability definition. They also access whether the 
capability definition lends itself to all-hazards or if it is specific to terrorism. A discussion 
of the capabilities and their relationship to all-hazards and/or terrorism follows each table. 
1. Common Core Capabilities 
The common core capabilities consist of planning, public information and warning 
and operational coordination. The definitions for these capabilities are explained in  
Table 1.80 
Table 1. Common Core Capability Definitions.81 
Common Core Capability Definitions 
Planning All-Hazards 
Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development 






Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community 
through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate 
methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions 





Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that 
appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities. 
 
The capabilities are referred to as common because they are associated with all five 
mission areas. These three capabilities are inherently linked to all five mission areas and 
are essential for the success of the rest of the capabilities.82 Given that these capabilities do 
span all mission areas, they must also address all-hazards including terrorism preparedness. 
All threats and hazards must be planned for, will require some level of information 
 
80 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3. 
81 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 6. 
82 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 4. 
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dissemination or warning, and demand a coordinated operation to address threats and 
hazards both before and after they occur.  
2. Prevention and Protection 
Some of the 32 core capabilities outlined in the Goal are only related to terrorism. 
The mission area of prevention is comprised of the first four capabilities listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Prevention and Protection Core Capability Definitions.83 





Conduct forensic analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods of 
terrorism) to their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and 







Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, 
collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and 
feedback of available information concerning physical and cyber threats to the United States, 
its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any 
other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by local, state, tribal, territorial, 
federal, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, 









Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance 
and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and 
assessments, bio surveillance, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence. 




Apply and support necessary physical, technological, and cyber measures to control 
admittance to critical locations and systems. 
Cybersecurity All-Hazards 
Protect (and if needed, restore) electronic communications systems, information, and 





Implement and maintain risk-informed countermeasures, and policies protecting people, 
borders, structures, materials, products, and systems associated with key operational 













Hazards Strengthen the security and resilience of the supply chain. 
 
The forensics and attribution capability is the only capability specific to the 
prevention mission area. The others, intelligence and information sharing, interdiction and 
disruption, and screening, search, and detection, are shared with the protection mission 
area. These two mission areas are considered together in this section due to this 
relationship. These four capabilities, as they relate to the prevention mission area, only 
 
83 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 7–10. 
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address the hazard of terrorism. The prevention capabilities are, “necessary to avoid, 
prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Unlike other mission areas, which 
are all-hazards by design, prevention core capabilities are focused specifically on imminent 
terrorist threats, including on-going attacks or stopping imminent follow-on attacks.”84  
It is important to note that the planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises 
necessary for preventing an act of terrorism are different from those required with respect 
to natural hazards. The mission area of prevention stands alone primarily because 
terrorism, unlike natural threats, can be prevented.  
Of the four capabilities associated with prevention discussed in the previous 
paragraph only intelligence and information sharing is attributable to all-hazards in the 
context of protection. The remaining two shared between protection and prevention are 
terrorism-specific due to their definition and relationship to human-caused incidents. The 
five remaining capabilities listed in Table 2 fall only within the protection area: access 
control and identity verification, cybersecurity, physical protective measures, risk 
management for protection programs and activities, and supply chain integrity and security 
are relatable to all-hazards including terrorism. Although the definitions associated with 
these capabilities have strong connotations to terrorism, they all play some role in 
protecting the public and infrastructure before and after a natural disaster. 
3. Mitigation 
Along the same lines, the mission area of mitigation is traditionally related to 
natural hazards, as seen in Table 3. The process of mitigation relies heavily on historical 
occurrences and the ability to predict the impact a hazard will have to implement actions 




84 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5. 
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Table 3. Mitigation Capability Definitions.85 





Enable the recognition, understanding, communication of, and planning for risk and empower 
individuals and communities to make informed risk management decisions necessary to adapt 






Build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources 
lifelines so as to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused threats 
and hazards by lessening the likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences. 





Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community 
members can take informed action to reduce their entity's risk and increase their resilience. 




Identify the threats and hazards that occur in the geographic area; determine the frequency 
and magnitude; and incorporate this into analysis and planning processes so as to clearly 
understand the needs of a community or entity. 
  
Where an earthquake will occur or what areas will flood can be predicted. The same 
can be said for predicting targets of terrorism. However, the human aspect that comes with 
terrorism allowing the perpetrator to adjust tactics or change targets is relatively 
unpredictable. Some capabilities fall within the protection mission area, such as physical 
protection measures that can be considered mitigation. An example is bollards placed 
around critical infrastructure to protect against a vehicle borne improvised explosive 
device. This capability is taken into consideration in Figure 4 in the earlier mission area 
discussion, where the mitigation exists slightly within the threat of terrorism and the 
mission area of protection.  
FEMA has an entire suite of grant programs dedicated to mitigation. In most cases, 
mitigation type projects are not be allowable under the FEMA preparedness grants given 
its relationship to natural hazards. Most of the projects that may have a nexus to terrorism 
that can be considered mitigation actually fall within the protection mission area. 
When examined further, the capabilities that make up mitigation listed in Table 3 
are specific to risk reduction, which involves identifying specific hazards, assessing the 
potential impact of these hazards, and applying this information to inform long-term 
vulnerability reduction. The end result of this process is more resilient communities. That 
said, nothing in the capability definitions tie them specifically to terrorism or natural 
hazards; therefore, they are applicable to all-hazards. 
 
85 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 11–12. 
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4. Response 
The mission area of response can be attributed to all-hazards including terrorism. 
This area focuses on managing the consequences of an incident and does not differ 
significantly whether the incident is the result of terrorism or a natural hazard. When 
examining the capabilities that make up the response mission area listed in Table 4, it is 
clear that not every capability is necessary to address every threat or hazard; but, it is 
equally clear that any of the capabilities can be needed depending on the incident whether 
from terrorism or natural causes. 
Table 4. Response Capability Definitions.86 





Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) 
for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the 






Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public 
and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations 





Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim 
identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal authorities 
to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage or permanent internment solutions, sharing 
information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and 





Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress 
fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the 





Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently 
restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community. 




Deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities 
and survivors, to include emergency power and fuel support, as well as the coordination of 
access to community staples. Synchronize logistics capabilities and enable the restoration of 
impacted supply chains. 
Mass Care Services All-Hazards 
Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, 
feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of 
emergency supplies. 




Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, 
animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of 
endangered lives in the shortest time possible. 
On-Scene Security, 




Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and 
protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for 





Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, 
and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in 







Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations 
and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and 





Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and 
extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response. 
 
 
86 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 13–17. 
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Critical transportation is equally important when clearing snow to allow first 
responders access, as it is to providing a means of evacuation for those affected by a 
terrorist attack. The same can be said for operational communications and the importance 
of being able to communicate with fellow responders and all levels of government 
regardless of what precipitated a disaster. 
5. Recovery  
Recovery is necessary following any disaster whether human-caused or natural. 
The capabilities associated with the recovery mission area are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5. Recovery Capability Definitions.87 
Recovery Core Capabilities 
Economic Recovery All-Hazards 
Return economic and business activities (including food and agriculture) to a healthy 
state and develop new business and employment opportunities that result in an 
economically viable community. 
Health and Social 
Services All-Hazards 
Restore and improve health and social services capabilities and networks to promote 
the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the 
whole community. 
Housing All-Hazards Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience. 
Natural and Cultural 
Resources All-Hazards 
Protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties through appropriate 
planning, mitigation, response, and recovery actions to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, 
and restore them consistent with post-disaster community priorities and best practices 
and in compliance with applicable environmental and historic preservation laws and 
executive orders. 
 
The economic recovery capability can be associated with any incident as a cost is 
associated with the response to and rebuilding from any incident. These costs can be 
attributable to individuals affected up to the federal government once the President declares 
a disaster. The same can be said of the housing capability and the need for short term-
shelters while flood waters recede or a complete relocation from an exclusion zone 
following a terror attack involving an improvised nuclear device. The rest of the recovery 
capabilities are specific to certain incidents but can be needed as the result of a natural 
hazard or human-caused threat.  
 
87 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 18–20. 
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6. Conclusion 
Although the majority FEMA’s national preparedness grants require a nexus to 
terrorism, this analysis indicates that despite the nexus, the funding from these grants likely 
provide benefits in the areas of protection, response, and recovery to natural and 
technological hazards as well. Of the 32 core capabilities, only three are identified as being 
terrorism specific. All others apply to all-hazards including terrorism. Therefore, a nexus 
to terrorism can be made through the lens of each of the capabilities. This relationship is 
reinforced within The DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted 
Violence attributes its four goals in achieving its mission and their applicability to each of 
the core capabilities.88 Even though this document is centered on countering terrorism, 
every capability is addressed in the DHS strategy including those residing within 
Mitigation.89 Conversely, the lesser funded, all-hazards focused, Emergency Management 
Performance Grant also provides many of the same benefits in the areas of protection, 
response, and recovery to the threat of terrorism. That said, the primary issue is the grant 
recipients’ ability to tie their funding requests to terrorism.  
FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate uses the definition of terrorism set forth in the 
Act given that it defines the purpose of the program. This definition of terrorism from the 
Act is:  
any activity that involves an act that (A) is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and is a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other 
subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.90  
While no set criteria determine whether a nexus to terrorism exists, this definition 
is used as the primary guide when proposed projects are reviewed for funding. As 
 
88 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 8. 
89 Department of Homeland Security, 8. 
90 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as Amended), Public Law 112–265 (2013): 10. 
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mentioned earlier, an expenditure may have a dual purpose and support a response to 
another type of disaster; however, the primary purpose must have a clear nexus to 
terrorism. Based solely on the capabilities examined in this chapter, this nexus does not 
seem to be a major limitation in addressing the needs of each capability.  
The next chapter goes a step further to examine how progress toward achieving the 
Goal is measured and how the nation has progressed in this endeavor to date. 
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IV. THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL— 
WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Goal was introduced in September 2011 as the strategic guidance document of 
the NPS required by PPD 8. One of the requirements of PPD 8 was the establishment of an 
annual NPR.91 The NPR evaluates and measures progress made toward achieving the goal 
and where improvement is still needed.92 The NPR is compiled from data derived from the 
states’ submitted SPRs to evaluate their ability annually to reach the capability targets 
identified in their THIRA. The SPR process involves identifying gaps in reaching the 
capability target through each of the elements of planning, organization, equipment, 
training, and exercises. The overall rating from 1–5 is calculated based on an average of 
the ratings for these five elements. The aggregated results of all the SPRs are compiled by 
FEMA’s National Preparedness Assessment Division (NPAD) into the NPR. This chapter 
analyzes these reports from the first in 2013 to the most recent released in 2019 to quantify 
what the reports indicate regarding the progress has been made toward achieving the Goal.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
It has been nearly 10 years since the inception of the Goal. The first version of the 
NPR was released by FEMA in 2013 based on SPRs submitted by the states in 2012. This 
process of releasing the NPR the following year to summarize the previous year’s data has 
been repeated annually through the current version released in 2018. A thorough analysis 
of the NPRs since 2014 revealed one annual dataset that could be used to deduce progress 
made toward achieving the Goal to date. This dataset is a chart showing the assessment of 
current capability included in every report from 2014 to 2018. The information in this 
recurring chart reflects the percentage of states that rated themselves at 1–2 (low), 
 
91 Barak Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,” Department of Homeland 
Security, July 7, 2008, https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness. 
92 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/184950. 
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3 (medium) or 4–5 (high) for each of the individual 32 core capabilities each respective 
year.  
The analysis process is shown using the example of the public information and 
warning capability.  
• The first piece of data necessary to begin the analysis is to determine the 
current capability rating. The current capability rating is derived from the 
assessment of current capability in the 2018 NPR. This rating is assigned 
based on the most frequent rating (or mode).93 This same process is used 
to determine the prior rating from 2014. Figure 5 shows the mode from 
both 2014 and 2018 for public information and warning remaining high 
for both years.  
• The next step in the analysis is to calculate and compare the percentage 
changes between the high, medium and low ratings from 2014–2018. This 
data is used to determine whether the current capability has increased, 
sustained, centralized, or been lost. The capability percentage change chart 
in Figure 5 indicates that the public information and warning capability 
has centralized because a similar loss of percentage has occurred from 
both the high and low ratings and a subsequent increase in medium. An 
increasing capability is represented by a loss in percentage from a lower 
rating with an increase in higher ratings. Lost capability is the exact 
opposite with percentages lost in higher ratings with increases in lower 
ones. Sustained capabilities are denoted when the percentage ratings have 
remained static.  
The Appendix provides an in-depth snapshot of each capability including 
comparison charts, such as Figure 5 and a discussion specific to the respective capability.  
 
93 One capability had a bimodal distribution. The fatality management systems capability had 36% of 
the states’ rating themselves in both low and high.  
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Figure 5. Public Information and Warning Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.94 
The results of the analysis are synthesized in Table 6 at the end of the chapter and 
broken out by whether capabilities have increased, centralized, sustained, or are lost.  
Capabilities take time and resources to build; therefore, incremental increases year 
to year are to be expected.95 Capabilities can experience a loss for several reasons. One 
consideration is the validation of capability through real-world exercises that may cause a 
state to reevaluate its rating in a specific area. Another possibility is that the target upon 
which the state has been rating itself is adjusted, which may impact the way the state views 
its ability to meet the target. The last possibility is the variability associated with the self-
assessing nature of the SPR, which is discussed further later in this chapter. 
C. CAPABILITY INCREASED 
Of the 32 capabilities that make up the Goal, 15 were increased: planning; 
screening, search, and detection; access control and identity verification; cybersecurity; 
threats and hazards identification; risk and disaster resilience assessment; community 
resilience; long-term vulnerability reduction; public health, healthcare, and emergency 
medical services; fire management and suppression; mass search and rescue operations; 
fatality management services; mass care services; health and social services; and natural 
and cultural resources.  
 
94 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 10; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2018 National Preparedness Report, 11  
95 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 10. 
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• All four of the capabilities in the mitigation mission area were increased. 
• Six capabilities increased despite already having a high rating.  
• One increased and still remained a medium. 
• Three increased but maintained their low rating.  
• Three of the capabilities were increased and were subsequently rated 
higher. One of these was health and social services that increased from a 
low to a high rating. The other two, long-term vulnerability reduction and 
mass care services went from a low to a medium.  
• Fatality management services increased as well but was the only outlier in 
the use of mode to determine current capability. The mode for 2014 was 
41% of states rating themselves low. However, a 4% increase in states 
rating themselves high resulted, coupled with a 5% decrease in low ratings 
when compared with 2018. Thus, the low rating percentage decreased to 
36% and the high rating increased the same. The fatality management 
services capability is reflected as being bimodal due to the equal high and 
low ratings.  
D. CAPABILITY CENTRALIZED 
Over the period researched, 14 capabilities were centralized. A centralized 
capability is one that lost percentage in both high and low ratings with a subsequent 
increase in medium. These capabilities were: public information and warning; operational 
coordination; intelligence and information sharing; forensics and attribution; physical 
protective measures; risk management for protection programs and activities; on-scene 
security, protection, and law enforcement; operational communications; situational 
assessment; environmental response/health and safety; critical transportation; logistics and 
supply chain management; economic recovery; and housing.  
• Eight were centralized but retained a high rating, one at a medium and two 
at low. 
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• Three of the capabilities dropped to a medium for a high as a result of the 
centralization. The economic recovery capability was one that was 
centralized but maintained a low rating. This result is concerning given the 
relationship that the economy has to resilience and security.  
E. CAPABILITY LOST 
Three capabilities were determined to have lost capability between 2014 and 2018. 
These capabilities are interdiction and disruption, supply chain integrity and security, and 
infrastructure systems.  
• Interdiction and disruption lost capability but remained rated high.  
• Infrastructure systems lost capability, which resulted in the rating also 
being lost from a high in 2014 to a current medium.  
• The most concerning of the capabilities indicating a loss is supply chain 
integrity and security that were already rated low.  
F. CAPABILITY SUSTAINED 
No capabilities remained the same from 2014 to 2018. 
G. CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GRANT FUNDING 
One aspect that must be considered in the context of this research is the relationship 
between the status of capabilities and the investments being made via FEMA grant funds. 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of FEMA funding invested in each core capability from FYs 
2017 and 2018. Based on this data, nearly half of the annual funding is being invested in 
the common capabilities of planning and operational coordination. Both of these 
capabilities are currently rated high with planning continuing to increase and operational 
coordination being centralized. This finding highlights the importance of these capabilities 
within the preparedness but also the costs associated with maintaining capability in  
these areas.  
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Figure 6. FEMA Preparedness Funding Percentages by Capability for 
FYs 2017 and 2018.96 
Areas of concern are the capabilities of operational communications and 
interdiction and disruption. The data from Figure 6 indicates that nearly 20% of annual 
funding is being invested in these high-rated capabilities. However, both capabilities have 
lost capability or were centralized from 2014 to 2018 despite the funds invested to maintain 
this high rating.  
One important takeaway from Figure 6 is the lack of investment in the prevention 
and protection mission areas. This takeaway seems contradictory to grant programs with a 
nexus to terrorism. The only assumption that can be made is that states are using the nexus 
 
96 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 9; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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to terrorism to build capabilities applicable to all-hazards including terrorism. Of the nine 
capabilities associated with these mission areas, three have increased, four have been 
centralized, and two have lost capability. The capabilities in these areas receiving the 
highest investments are intelligence and information sharing, and interdiction and 
disruption. This finding seems to align with the requirements in SHSP and UASI to make 
annual investments in the sustainment of fusion centers and LETPA. These areas are 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
The primary finding in the analysis of the relationship of funding to capabilities is 
that it is difficult to determine what impact these investments are having. Some cases where 
capability increases can be related back to investments; but, the converse is also true in that 
capability can be lost despite the funding it has received. In the future, it may be beneficial 
for FEMA to consider ways to make this correlation so that a return on investment can be 
calculated by capability to understand better the impact these investments are making 
toward achieving the Goal. 
H. DATA SUMMARY TABLE 
Table 6 summarizes the analysis of each capability broken out by mission area to 
provide an overall snapshot of findings. The prior rating column indicates the mode from 
the 2014 NPR that can be compared with the current rating column representing the mode 
from the 2018 NPR data. The capability status column indicates whether the capability was 
increased, centralized, lost, or sustained. As mentioned previously, no capabilities 
remained the same from 2014 to 2018, and therefore, no capabilities were sustained. The 
fact that nearly all the capabilities have either increased or centralized suggests that the 
capabilities are moving in the right direction. Capabilities that centralized lost some high 
ratings but also decreased in those rating themselves low.  
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Table 6. Chapter IV Summary Table 





Common Core Capabilities 
Planning High High Increased 
Public Information and Warning High High Centralized 
Operational Coordination High High Centralized 
 Prevention/Protection Core Capabilities 
Intelligence and Information Sharing High High Centralized 
Interdiction and Disruption High High Lost 
Screening, Search, and Detection Medium Medium Increased 
Forensics and Attribution High Medium Centralized 
Physical Protective Measures High Medium Centralized 
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities High Medium Centralized 
Access Control and Identity Verification Low Low Increased 
Supply Chain Integrity and Security Low Low Lost 
Cybersecurity Low Low Increased 
Mitigation Core Capabilities 
Threats and Hazards Identification High High Increased 
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment High High Increased 
Community Resilience High High Increased 
Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Low Medium Increased 
Response Core Capabilities 
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services High High Increased 
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement High High Centralized 
Operational Communications High High Centralized 
Situational Assessment High High Centralized 
Environmental Response/Health and Safety High High Centralized 
Fire Management and Suppression High High Increased 
Critical Transportation High High Centralized 
Mass Search and Rescue Operations High High Increased 
Fatality Management Services Low Bimodal97 Increased 
Mass Care Services Low Medium Increased 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management Medium Medium Centralized 
Infrastructure Systems High Medium Lost 
Recovery Core Capabilities 
Economic Recovery Low Low Centralized 
Health and Social Services Low High Increased 
Housing Low Low Centralized 
Natural and Cultural Resources Low Low Increased 
 
 
97 The percentage of states that rated themselves high and low was identical in the 2018 NPR. Given 
the mode methodology for assigning capability ratings, this rating was an outlier. 
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I. DATA RELIABILITY CONCERNS 
Many questions also remain regarding the reliability of the data used to aggregate 
the NPR. The primary concern with the data provided by the NPR is that it is based on the 
SPR, which is a self-assessment completed annually by each state. These self-assessments 
may be based on comprehensive and consistent data, but no process exists for ensuring 
so.98 This self-assessment process raises serious concerns over its ability to be objective, 
which also brings in to question its credibility.99 The other aspect that may skew results 
from state to state is the THIRA process and the variability in developing capability targets. 
These capability targets are what the states use to rate themselves within the SPR. These 
targets can potentially be adjusted year to year as well. Given that each state may vary in 
its hazards of concern, desired outcomes and potential impact, substantial differences may 
likely occur between the goal that each state is trying to reach through the lens of each 
individual core capability. 
J. CONCLUSION 
On the surface, it appears that the system used to denote the nation’s progress 
toward meeting the Goal is indicating that some progress has been made since 2014 in the 
form of capabilities being increased. However, it becomes concerning when considering 
that many of the capabilities being centralized or lost are also the capabilities receiving the 
most grant funding. The funding data is based on funding amounts attributed to each 
capability in the 2017 and 2018 NPRs. Missing from this research is any indication as to 
how the funding impacted the capability to which it was attributed because this data does 
not exist. Although concerns have been raised about the reliability of the NPR and the 
process used to aggregate this data, the system in place and the findings associated with it 
must be considered indicative of the progress the country has made in reaching the Goal. 
In the next chapter, the preparedness grants programs are examined further.  
 
98 Jerome H. Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” Homeland Security Affairs 10, art. 
2 (February 2014): 6, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/252. 
99 Kahan, 6. 
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V. NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GRANTS 
AND THE STRATEGIC INTENT OF THE 
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The grant programs that comprise the HSGP were authorized by Congress with the 
passage of the Act. This Act created DHS and required the establishment of grant programs 
designed to assist with state, local, tribal and territorial efforts in combatting terrorism.100 
The additional programs afforded by the Act made FEMA the largest provider of 
preparedness funding.101 This Act was amended with the passage of the Homeland Security 
Grant Enhancement Act of 2003, which provided additional guidance on the administration 
of the grants.102 The grant programs associated with this Act have been consolidated or 
cancelled over the years as the program has evolved.  
As of 2020, 10 programs make up FEMA’s HSGP: the SHSP, the UASI, OSG, 
Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP), Nonprofit Security Grant Program 
(NSGP), Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), Intercity Bus Security Grant Program 
(IBSGP), Intercity Passenger Rail (IPR) Program–Amtrak, Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP), and EMPG. All these, with the exception of the EMPG, require that proposed 
projects have a nexus to terrorism preparedness. This nexus is required due to the language 
in the authorizing statute, which is the Act. The purpose of this chapter is to examine all 
aspects of these programs to discover ways the programs can be adjusted to align better 
with the strategic intent of the Goal. 
B. METHOD 
The analysis for this chapter involves the examination of three areas. These areas 
include the authorization for the various programs, annual congressional appropriations, 
 
100 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2012, H.R. Report 112–91, 112th Cong., 1st 
sess. (2012), 57, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/house-report/091. 
101 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 8. 
102 Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2003, S. 1245, 108th Congr., 1st sess. (2004), 1, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senate-bill/1245.  
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and the return on investment realized after the grant has been awarded. For a grant to come 
into existence, Congress has to create a law authorizing the program. These authorizations 
contain language that informs the subsequent guidance that tells recipients what the 
program is designed to accomplish and what activities are eligible. This research involves 
an examination of the language within the statutes that originally authorized the 
preparedness grants along with the original grant guidance. These original documents are 
then compared with subsequent authorizations and guidance to determine if Congress made 
any changes to these statutes that may allow the grant to be adjusted to align with the Goal. 
In addition to the authorization that must be made to institute a grant program, 
Congress must also appropriate funds annually to finance the programs. These 
appropriations are indicative of the perceived value and prioritization of the programs in 
Congress, which involves the analysis of the appropriation levels since the inception of the 
Goal to ascertain how or if funding levels have changed over time. This aspect, coupled 
with findings from the NPR in the previous chapter, can establish a linkage between the 
level of appropriation and the progress made toward building capability since 2013.  
To understand the value of these grant programs fully, the return on investment 
must also be considered. The return on investment indicates the benefits the nation is 
receiving in relation to the appropriations discussed previously. The process of calculating 
return on investment can simply be based on the value of cost share where a recipient of 
federal funds is required to match the federal amount with non-federal funds. More 
complex calculations also involve the value of the items purchased with the grant funds by 
the ongoing benefit they provide to the recipient, their regional partners, or the nation. This 
research involves locating documents that denote the return on investment for the 
respective grant program. This research, coupled with the history of congressional 
appropriations, provides an overall picture of the strengths and weaknesses of FEMA’s 
preparedness grants as they relate to the achievement of the Goal. 
C. AUTHORIZATIONS 
The introduction of the Goal in 2011 represented a new benchmark for 
preparedness grants to achieve. The Goal provides a process via the THIRA and the SPR 
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for each state to utilize in determining the areas of responsibility the grant funds address. 
This new concept was rolled out in the Fiscal Year 2012 guidance for the HSGP. Despite 
this new all-hazards approach, each project funded by HSGP is still required to be tied to 
the nexus of terrorism given that the authorizing statute, the Act, remained the same. 
FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate uses the definition of terrorism set forth in the 
Act given that it defines the purpose of the program. This definition of terrorism from the 
Act is:  
any activity that involves an act that (A) is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and is a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other 
subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.103  
While no set criteria for determining whether a nexus to terrorism exists, this 
definition is used as the primary guide when proposed projects are reviewed for funding. 
It is understood that an expenditure may have a dual purpose and support response to 
another type of disaster; however, the primary purpose must have a clear nexus to 
terrorism. Two instances have occurred since the introduction of the Goal where the HSGP 
guidance has referenced that capabilities associated with the response to catastrophic 
events can also be addressed with HSGP funding. This guidance was in the Fiscal Year 
2013 Funding Opportunity Announcement and the Preparedness Grants Manual released 
in April 2019. The most recent iteration released in April 2019 states, “SHSP and UASI 
funding can be used to enhance preparedness for other catastrophic events e.g. hurricanes 
and wildfires, as long as such use of the funds has a nexus to preventing, preparing for, 
protecting against, and responding to terrorism.”104 Although this statement represents a 
movement to address other capabilities outside the areas of prevention and protection, the 
investment justification for the project must still be tied to terrorism preparedness.  
 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as Amended), 9. 
104 FEMA Grant Programs Directorate, FEMA Preparedness Grants Manual (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019), 6. 
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It is clear that some aspects of terrorism preparedness resonate outside the areas of 
prevention and protection. Most of the capabilities associated with mitigation, response, 
and recovery can be attributed to the response and recovery to a terror attack as much as 
the response and recovery to a natural hazard event. That said, some limitations exist with 
regard to the required nexus of terrorism and the state’s ability to use preparedness grant 
funds to address all the core capabilities. Within each of the core capabilities, elements of 
planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises are necessary to meet the 
capability target. The main limitation is simply the capacity for the state to attribute its 
needs to a terror-related incident based on one or more of these elements within the 
parameters of the definition outlined in the Act. An example of a grant investment tied to 
terrorism that may have benefits responding to other hazards is the Boston urban area 
purchased a patient tracking system to be used on mass-casualty incidents through the 
UASI program.105 No question remains that a nexus to terrorism resides with this system; 
however, its use can be applied to mass casualty incidents stemming from any type of 
hazard event.  
An example of where the nexus to terrorism requirement was limiting involves a 
request from a state to which the author was party.106 In this instance, the state was 
requesting to use SHSP funds to purchase single use personal protective equipment kits to 
protect first responders from being exposed to fentanyl in response to the ever-growing 
opioid crisis gripping the entire nation. The request was denied on the basis that the state 
could not provide a nexus to terrorism. However, the same state had just experienced a 
major mass casualty incident where more than 70 people became ill or overdosed after 
being sold marijuana laced with fentanyl.107 Despite the fact that it was not a terror attack, 
it would seem that a case could have been made that a terrorist could have perpetrated an 
 
105 Peter T. King, Yvette D. Clarke, and Brian Higgins, Stakeholder Assessments of the 
Administration’s National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2014), 3. 
106 The author is a Lead Grants Management Specialist in FEMA Region One and was included in the 
request to FEMA HQ to use the SHSP funds for the purpose indicated. 
107 Scott Neuman, “Dozens Overdose in Connecticut Park on Tainted Synthetic Marijuana,” NPR, 
August 16, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/639133355/dozens-overdose-in-connecticut-park-on-
tainted-synthetic-marijuana. 
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attack using a similar method. In this case, the project met the criteria for Part A of the 
Act definition but did not meet Part B because it did not, “influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”108 This example is just one of how a nexus to 
terrorism requirement can be prohibitive to grant recipients using their funds to address 
their greatest risks.  
Along similar lines, recipients of SHSP and UASI funds are required to tie annual 
investments to the development of fusion centers and LETPA. The 2019 HSGP Notice of 
Funding Opportunity states, “Per section 2006 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
amended, DHS/FEMA is required to ensure that at least 25 percent of grant funding 
appropriated for grants awarded under HSGP’s authorizing statute are used for LETPA.”109 
A requirement also exists that at least one project identified within the state or urban area’s 
annual application must be tied to the development or sustainment of their fusion centers.110 
Unlike the requirement for LETPA funding, a percentage designated to fund fusion centers 
is not required. Fusion centers serve as the information-sharing hub within state and urban 
areas between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector stakeholders. The 
funding required for these areas can only be used within the mission areas of prevention 
and protection. The National Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC) conducted a return 
on investment study in 2018. The results of this study showed a major increase in the 
number of hazardous materials teams, incident management teams, and urban search and 
rescue teams had been established with HSGP funds.111 The same study touts 
improvements to fusion centers and increased coordination through training and 
exercises.112 Although these needs are critical, they are not specific to terrorism or law 
enforcement. In fact, nothing in this document referenced any significant returns in the area 
 
108 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as Amended), 9. 
109 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 2019 HSGP Notice of Funding 
Opportunity, 7. 
110 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 14. 
111 National Homeland Security Consortium, Homeland Security Grant Return on Investment 
(Lexington, KY: National Homeland Security Consortium, 2018), 5. 
112 National Homeland Security Consortium, 5. 
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of LETPA. Some may question if this restriction places limitations on recipients’ ability to 
maximize funding with respect to the strategic intent of the Goal.  
Several issues may be prohibitive to moving away from the nexus to terrorism 
described previously. The first issue is the opinion of the public as it pertains to terrorism. 
In the wake of 9/11, the percentage of Americans who believed that it was likely or very 
likely that another terrorist attack would occur resulting in a large number of American 
casualties was over 70 percent.113 Similar polls taken as recently as 2013 also indicate that 
this sentiment has not changed.114 Despite the absence of a major terrorist attack on 
American soil since 9/11, it is unlikely that Congress would change legislation in a way 
contrary to the view of over 70 percent of their constituents. The second concern is for the 
funding associated with these authorizations. If Congress changed the legislation to remove 
the nexus to terrorism, the question could be raised as to why investments continue to be 
made at their current levels that could result in subsequent reductions in future 
appropriations, which could have negative cascading effects on achieving the Goal.  
D. APPROPRIATIONS 
Another potential limitation is the level of funding currently being applied to the 
preparedness grant programs. Funding levels have gone from a high of $3.53 billion in 
FY 2004 to a low of $1.439 billion in FY 2013.115 The ebb and flow of funding from the 
inception of the program to FY 2016 is reflected in Figure 7.116 The funding levels continue 
to remain closer to the lower amount with the FY 2019 allocation totaling $1.715 billion.117 
It is worth noting that the decrease in funding levels began in relation to the adoption of 
the Goal.  
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CRS Report No. R44669 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 14. 
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Figure 7. Total DHS Assistance for States and Localities, FY 2002–FY 2016.118 
Various schools of thought discuss the reasons behind the drop in congressional 
appropriations for these programs. The first viewpoint is that after receiving a total of 
$52 billion since 2002, the homeland security needs of the states and their jurisdictions 
would have been met.119 This belief could potentially mean the funding levels have 
dropped to a level allowing for capabilities to be sustained as opposed to being built. It was 
expected to take years to secure a nation as open and vast as the United States. It is possible 
that Congress simply saw the transition to the Goal as an indication that the nation was 
secure and no longer needed the same level of funding to address capabilities associated 
with terrorism.120 Another explanation for the reduction in funding is the fact that a major 
terror attack has not occurred on American soil since 9/11. After the attacks on 9/11, the 
fear of another attack fueled the need to build intelligence and security capabilities, which 
 
118 Source: Reese, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants, 14. 
119 Reese, 17. 
120 Mueller, Chasing Ghosts, 13. 
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resulted in the perpetuation of the homeland security enterprise.121 With the first major 
reduction in funding being 10 years post-9/11, it seems plausible that many of those fears 
may have waned with the absence of a follow-on major attack.  
As suggested in Chapter IV, reductions in capability have occurred that can be 
correlated with the concurrent reduction in funding. In a 2018 survey conducted by the 
NHSC, states reported experiencing difficulty sustaining capability.122 The survey also 
notes that states are already sacrificing training and exercises to maintain the status quo 
and expect more substantial future loss as major equipment purchases made using grant 
funds need to be replaced.123 This being the case, the concept of reducing funds to a level 
consistent with sustainment is not being realized. In fact, a case can be made that funding 
should be increased to ensure that state, local, tribal, and territorial entities have the 
resources necessary to achieve the strategic intent of the Goal. 
The requirement for investments to be made in both fusion centers and LETPA is 
substantial for recipients of SHSP and UASI funding. With congressional appropriations 
for the programs significantly decreasing since FY 2013, less funding is spread around 
even though percentages are relative. Based on a 2016 report from DHS, between FYs 
2008 and 2015, recipients of SHSP and UASI have expended more than $4 billion on 
LETPA, which is more than 40% of the funds allocated.124 This finding suggests that grant 
recipients are investing more than is required in this area, which is likely due to states 
maintaining funding levels to LETPA despite the significant decrease in overall funding. 
This number does not include the investments being made in fusion centers. It is 
conceivable that nearly 50% of funds being allocated through SHSP and UASI are being 
spent in the areas of prevention and protection, which leaves the remaining 50% of the 
funding to potentially be used in the areas of response and recovery. This percentage makes 
the loss of capability in the areas of prevention and protection indicated in the NPR’s from 
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124 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2008–2015 Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Activity Funding (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 1. 
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Fiscal Year 2013–2018 even more difficult to fathom given the investments being made in 
these areas. 
In contrast to other preparedness grants, the EMPG program is predicated around 
providing federal funds to states to assist state, local, territorial, and tribal governments in 
all-hazards preparedness to support the achievement of the Goal.125 The primary 
authorizing statutes of the program, Section 662 of the PKEMRA, as amended, and the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, provide 
recipients of the EMPG substantial latitude in determining how their funding is to be 
invested. Similar to the SHSP and UASI, projects identified within annual applications 
have to be attributed to gaps or needs identified through the THIRA/SPR process.126 
However, these projects are not required to have a nexus to terrorism. A degree of 
ambiguity surrounds how the program guidance is applied that allows the program to 
conform to the state versus the state to the program. When considering the flocculation 
between the states with relation to the core capabilities and the elements needed to meet 
the strategic intent of the Goal, this flexibility is critical. 
E. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
In August 2018, the NHSC released a study on the return on investment specific to 
the SHSP and UASI. The purpose of the report was to compare the funds spent since the 
inception of the programs to the capability built as a result of this spending. The study was 
conducted through a survey of 40 states. The results of the survey indicated that for every 
dollar spent, the median return was $1.70.127 Recipients of these programs do not have any 
cost share requirements. The report touts the development of specialized teams, the 
maturation of fusion centers, and the enhancement of multi-jurisdictional coordination as 
some of the main benefits of the spending within these programs.128 
 
125 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FY2019 EMPG Notice of Funding Opportunity, 3. 
126 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2. 
127 National Homeland Security Consortium, Homeland Security Grant Return on Investment, 4. 
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56 
Cost share is an element that differentiates the EMPG from its preparedness grant 
counterparts. Recipients of EMPG are required to contribute one dollar for every federal 
dollar spent through the program.129 For FY 2019, EMPG was funded at $350,100,000.130 
With the required cost share, this number equates to a total investment of $700,200,000. 
Once this unique feature of EMPG is brought into the equation, it is the highest funded 
program of the grant programs that make up the HSGP. This being the case, it may be 
worth considering a cost share for some or all of the other programs in HSGP as a method 
of addressing the funding shortfalls in congressional appropriations since 2013. 
No publicly published document has been produced to study the return on 
investment for EMPG. However, it can be assumed that a similar return results as described 
in the NHSC report. That said, these perceived returns, along with the cost share 
requirement proscribed for EMPG, means the overall return on investment may be quite 
high. Using the 2019 appropriation for HSGP of $1,095,000,000, and applying the return 
on investment of $1.70, the result is $1,861,500,000 realized. For EMPG, using the 2019 
appropriation of $350,100,000, and adding the cost share, which doubles that amount to 
$700,200,000, and then using a similar equation for return on investment, the final tally for 
EMPG is $1,190,340,000, which is nearly a million dollars more than the HSGP 
appropriation with only a third of the federal funding spent. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it can be ascertained that some slight modifications to the legislative 
aspects and guidance language to help the HSGP better align with the Goal have been made 
to allow states desiring to utilize their grant funding in the areas of response and recovery 
to all-hazards but under the pretense of terrorism preparedness. Despite these apparent 
concessions and the prevalence of natural disasters, HSGP recipients are still heavily 
investing in the areas of prevention and protection. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
minimal gains have been made in the capabilities that make up these mission areas despite 
the heavy investments being made. Thus, it seems worth considering applying aspects of 
 
129 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FY2019 EMPG Notice of Funding Opportunity, 7. 
130 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5. 
57 
the long-standing EMPG program to the HSGP. This application includes a holistic all-
hazards approach to provide additional flexibility without the nexus to terrorism to allow 
recipients simply to use the funds to meet their needs without having to be creative with 
their investment justifications. The cost-share and ultimate return on investment associated 
with EMPG should also be considered for application within HSGP. Taking the 
$1,095,000,000 awarded in 2019, and doubling that to $2,190,000,000, and then applying 
the return on investment from the NHSC report, the $3,723,000,000 can go a long way to 
filling the gap left by the reduction in congressional appropriations. 
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VI. THE ATTEMPT AT CONSOLIDATION 
In February 2002, DHS and the FEMA proposed the creation of the NPGP. This 
proposal suggested that 16 of the DHS preparedness grant programs be consolidated into 
one program. The purpose of the NPGP was to: 
Focus on the development and sustainment of the core capabilities 
identified in the National Preparedness Goal; Utilize the capability 
estimation process employed by applicants and verified by DHS to 
determine capability and resource deficiencies to inform the competitive 
process and; Build a robust national preparedness capacity based on cross-
jurisdictional and readily deployable state and local assets.131  
The NPGP, as proposed, would be granted to and administered by the states and territories. 
These awards would be sub-granted by the states based upon needs and gaps identified in 
risk assessments conducted by the jurisdiction where a project would be implemented. In 
addition, the states would be required to establish a peer review process to prioritize awards 
based on how the project would build or sustain the current capabilities and address gaps 
identified. The state would also have to ensure that the result of the proposed project could 
be weighted as a national resource that would be beneficial to the community, the region, 
and the state.132 This chapter examines the proposed NPGP, the legislation, and subsequent 
congressional testimony to determine what can be gleaned toward achieving the strategic 
intent of the Goal. 
In a prepared statement provided to Congress on June 25, 2013, FEMA Deputy 
Administrator, Tim Manning, stated, “creating this program would create a robust national 
network of capabilities, eliminate redundancies and make the most of our limited resources, 
while strengthening our ability to respond to evolving threats across America.”133 In the 
same hearing, John Madden, the President of the National Emergency Management 
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Association (NEMA), submitted a statement on behalf of NEMA and the Governors 
Homeland Security Advisors Council (GHSAC) in support of the program concept but 
with reservations. Madden praised the progress that had been made through the homeland 
security grants to address shortfalls identified after September 11, 2001.134 Madden also 
referenced recent events, such as Hurricane Sandy and the bombing of the Boston 
Marathon, remind the nation that the hazards that affect communities are always 
evolving.135 Along with his endorsement for a consolidated program, Madden offered  
a set of guiding principles to assist FEMA as the concept of the NPGP evolves. These 
principles are to improve flexibility, expand accountability, develop performance metrics, 
support a skilled workforce, and reaffirm the alliance between stakeholders at all  
levels of government.136 
Later in the hearing, prepared statements from representatives from counties, 
municipalities, and private sector organizations were read in opposition to the NPGP. The 
majority of the representatives spoke to the impact the homeland security grants, in their 
current configuration, had on their level of preparedness that included discussions 
concerning how a consolidated grant program administered by the state could cause the 
capabilities built over the past 10 years to be eroded away. FEMA was not able to provide 
specifics on how the funding levels these jurisdictions had been receiving would be 
affected under the proposed program. It was this uncertainty that resonated with Congress, 
which resulted in the NPGP not being considered. 
The NPGP was proposed again in 2014 to be included in the FY 2015 budget. A 
similar testimony was given on behalf of FEMA by Administrator Craig Fugate. Despite 
making changes to the legislation in response to local concerns from the prior year, the 
NPGP met with the same fate. One of the more compelling statements was made by Mayor 
Steven Fulop of Jersey City, NJ. He said: 
The NPGP proposal rejects the pragmatic regionalist approach to disaster 
and emergency management in favor of a statewide managed individualized 
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61 
project-based approach like those characteristics of other block grant 
programs in which local governments compete for resources. The critical 
key to emergency management is cooperation, not competition, this 
proposal fosters the inverse of a desired governmental result.137  
Fulop went on to discuss some of the disaster response successes the city had realized as a 
result of the DHS preparedness funding they had received over the past 10 years, and how 
future responses could be impacted without federal funding.138 Similar to the first iteration, 
the NPGP would never leave the committee.  
The NPGP would never be realized. However, it does provide some insight into the 
concerns FEMA had with regard to the programs aligning with the Goal and reducing the 
redundancy associated with some of the preparedness grants. It also provides insight to the 
concerns UASI recipients had with consolidating the UASI program into one state-
administered program. In a response to questions from the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee 
on Homeland Security, FEMA stated that the NPGP would remove the terrorism nexus 
from the programs, which expanded their scope to allow recipients to meet the strategical 
intent of the NPGP better.139 Recipients of the UASI funding were included. In addition, 
FEMA indicated redundancy would be reduced in the form of one guidance, decreased 
monitoring requirements while increasing monitoring efficiency, and the elimination of 
numerous and conflicting statutory requirements.140 FEMA also planned to retain the 
80% pass-through requirement to local units of government while eliminating the 25% set 
aside for LETPA.141 Ultimately, FEMA’s vision for the NPGP was to provide the states 
with a program that would allow them the flexibility to allocate dollars to their unique areas 
of greatest risk. 
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In a prepared statement to the same committee, Kris Eide, Director of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management for the State of Minnesota, argued on behalf of the 
NPGP. Eide stated that the NPGP would provide the flexibility necessary to address the 
changing hazard environment while improving the ability to sustain prior investments and 
ensuring they were made based on statewide and regional priorities.142 Eide argued that the 
preparedness grant programs in their current state did not support efforts to align state and 
local capability with national priorities.143 In alignment with the FEMA stance, Eide said 
that the NPGP would improve program effectiveness, accountability, and transparency 
while reducing redundancy.144 
On the local side, mayors and public safety officials representing predominantly 
urban areas expressed their many concerns to the Committee. The primary concern was the 
uncertainty of the funding these urban areas would receive under a state administered 
program. David Riggs, the Director of the Department of Public Safety for the City of 
Indianapolis, Indiana expressed concern over the elimination of the 25% set aside for 
LETPA and the impact it would have on local jurisdictions’ ability to implement prevention 
activities.145 Chief William Metcalf of the North County Fire Protection District in 
California was representing the International Association of Fire Chiefs. Metcalf expressed 
concerns with the consistency of the THIRA process and the lack of local involvement. 
Given that investments under the NPGP would be made using the information derived from 
this process, the lack of local involvement could have a detrimental impact on local 
funding.146 In addition, Metcalf suggested that consolidating the programs could affect the 
capabilities that had been built with UASI funding since the program’s inception.147 
In sum, the failure of the proposed NPGP was not due to it being a bad concept. Its 
failure was primarily due to the uncertainty that existed in the infancy of the proposal that 
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did not clearly articulate how UASI recipients would be affected by the consolidation. 
When proposing changes to a funding mechanism as significant as UASI, a solution has to 
be built into the guidance to ensure that some degree of funding remains in place to address 
these higher risk municipalities. The flexibility that would have been provided to the states 
to address their individual threats and hazards would have functioned much like the EMPG 
discussed earlier. The nexus to terrorism identified as a potential limitation would have no 
longer been an issue but states could still address the hazard of terrorism given the all-
encompassing nature of the proposed NPGP to include the option to fund LETPA at a level 
consistent with the identified threat to each individual state. One consideration for the 
future of the HSGP programs would be simply to eliminate the nexus to terrorism. 
However, eliminating this nexus to terrorism could also place those same grant programs 
at risk as Congress could sunset these programs in favor of other all-hazards related 
programs, such as EMPG, but funded at much lower levels. The loss of this funding would 
leave substantial voids in the nation’s ability to achieve the Goal, which makes the 
alleviation of the nexus not worth the risk. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the analysis for this thesis has shown that FEMA’s national preparedness 
grants are allowing the nation to make slow but steady progress toward achieving the Goal 
of a secure and resilient nation, in spite of challenges, such as assigning a nexus to terrorism 
and the decline of congressional appropriation levels. The following paragraphs provide a 
summation of each analysis chapter. 
Chapter III provided an analysis of the 32 capabilities outlined in the Goal to 
determine if the nexus to terrorism associated with most of FEMA’s national preparedness 
grant programs impact the strategic intent of the Goal. The main takeaway from this 
analysis is that the nexus to terrorism required by most of the preparedness grant 
programs has minimal limitations on where a grant recipient may want to invest their 
funds toward the achievement of the Goal. This takeaway is primarily due to the majority 
of capabilities applying to all-hazards to include terrorism. However, between the HSGP 
Guidance that requires this nexus to a real or perceived threat of terrorism and the definition 
of terrorism set forth in the Act, some limiting factors can possibly impact where potential 
investments can be made.  
Chapter IV examined the results of the NPR to determine how far the nation had 
progressed toward achieving the strategic intent of the Goal. An analysis of the NPRs 
from 2014 to 2018 indicated that most of the core capabilities have had modest 
increases or are at least sustaining. However, this progress could not be correlated with 
funding investments in capability as some capabilities, such as operational 
communications, were lost despite large investments. Capabilities associated with 
terrorism have seen modest improvements but funding data from 2017 and 2018 indicate 
that FEMA’s preparedness funding is being heavily invested in areas that address all-
hazards despite the required nexus to terrorism. The nation has realized a loss in the housing 
capability and difficulty sustaining the common area of operational coordination, which 
impacts every facet of homeland security and emergency management. This loss has 
resulted despite heavy investments, but the challenges associated with these examples also 
coincide with the unprecedented 2017-disaster season.  
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Chapter V looked at FEMA’s preparedness grants and how they could be adjusted 
to align better with the strategic intent of the Goal. The primary concerns highlighted in 
this chapter are the risks associated with declining appropriations and the limitations 
that the nexus to terrorism has on the ability of grant recipients to address all risks. 
Many of programs were born from the attacks on 9/11. Nearly 20 years later, these 
programs remain largely unchanged despite the introduction of the Goal in 2011 and the 
absence of a major terror attack in the United States since their inception. It can be argued 
that the lack of terror attacks is attributable to the investments made in preventing them. 
However, the minimal investments being made in prevention capabilities as discussed in 
the previous chapter seem to contradict that school of thought. This absence of terror has 
also precipitated the decrease in congressional funding for these programs. These cuts in 
the annual amount of funding allocated to the programs is having many cascading effects 
including the loss or foreseeable loss of capability, increased spending in the LETPA area 
to maintain earlier funding levels, and the inability to maintain expensive equipment 
purchased when the appropriation level was much higher. Another finding was that the 
language in the statute authorizing these programs created some limitations in how the 
required nexus to terrorism could be applied. The example of the PPE to protect first 
responders from fentanyl exposure highlights how this limitation could prohibit a state or 
urban area from addressing a significant risk. The return on investment was also considered 
for these programs through the lens of cost share in the case of EMPG and in the benefits 
derived as they related to cost in the case of SHSP and UASI.  
Chapter VI analyzed the proposed NPGP. This program was FEMA’s attempt to 
reorganize and consolidate its preparedness grant programs to align with the strategic intent 
of the Goal upon is inception. This analysis was conducted to determine what could be 
gleaned from FEMA’s vision for the program and the reasons it ultimately failed. Even 
though this initiative did fail, the intent provided some indications of how FEMA planned 
to change the structure of the programs. The primary takeaway from this chapter is that 
FEMA’s vision of the best way to adjust the programs to achieve the Goal is the 
elimination of the nexus to terrorism and the consolidation of the programs to align 
better with the all-hazards focused Goal. Despite the intent, the NPGP ultimately failed 
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due to the uncertainty expressed by UASI recipients regarding the loss of funding and the 
potential risks to the programs posed by the disassociation to terrorism.  
In sum, the culmination of this research reveals that the relationship between the 
national preparedness grant programs and the achievement of the Goal are for the most part 
in alignment but can be improved. The next sections provide a discussion regarding the 
process for deciding on the recommendations to include those recommendations 
considered but not put forth.  
A. DISCUSSION 
The purpose for this section is to discuss ideas related to the findings but which are 
more speculative in nature. 
1. Consolidation of Programs 
One of the primary considerations was the concept of consolidation. FEMA’s 
proposed NPGP has significant merit, as well as its intended alignment with the Goal. One 
option considered by the author was to propose consolidating EMPG and SHSP into one 
program similar to that of the proposed NPGP along with a 50/50 cost share to provide an 
all-hazards based grant program focused on allowing the states to invest their funds in 
building the 32 core capabilities while addressing their greatest risks. The second part of 
this option was to keep the UASI as a separate program but remove the nexus to terrorism 
requirement in favor of an all-hazards focus but with the addition of a 25% cost share to 
allow FEMA to continue funding the urban areas using similar risk methodologies but 
provide the urban areas more flexibility in building capability and addressing risks in 
alignment with the Goal.  
The primary reason why these concepts did not become recommendations revolves 
around the potential risk to the programs. The SHSP and UASI currently authorized by the 
Act likely need some major legislative changes to be changed to the degree suggested. One 
of the issues found when discussing appropriations in Chapter V was the significant drop 
in appropriation levels with the introduction of the all-hazards related Goal. Asking 
Congress to change programs centered on terrorism to address all-hazards as suggested 
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could create a similar situation and put the current funding levels in jeopardy. That said, 
the programs could be slightly adjusted in some ways to help them better align with the 
strategic intent of the Goal. Those ideas are discussed in the next section. 
2. Applying a Cost Share to SHSP and UASI 
Another concept to consider is to apply a cost share to the largest funded of the 
HSGP programs; SHSP and UASI currently do not require one. One of the major issues 
discussed in Chapter V was the diminishing appropriation levels for all the HSGP related 
programs. Applying these cost shares to these programs would bring the funding amounts 
to levels not seen since 2011. As with the prior recommendations made, this funding would 
go a long way toward bridging the funding gap created by decreased appropriation levels. 
In the case of SHSP, the recommendation is to apply a similar 50/50 cost share as required 
by EMPG. The 2019 appropriation for SHSP was $415 million. If the cost share is applied, 
the total amount of funding applied to this area will be $830 million. If the current return 
on investment $1.70 is applied to the federal share, an additional $290 million can be 
realized. For the American taxpayer, it means spending $415 million but getting over 
$700 million in return when the cost shares is added in. An issue associated with the new 
cost share requirement will be the potential strain on the state budgets. However, many 
aspects of the state budgets are not now being used as a match for EMPG. The combination 
of these two programs would allow a vaster application of the state’s current general fund 
toward matching these federal investments.  
Given that the resources of the urban areas are likely more limited than the  
states, a more attainable cost share of 25% is recommended for UASI. Based on the 2019 
appropriation of $590,000,000, a 25% cost share would increase the total investment to 
$737,500,000. If the past return on investment of 1.70 is also applied, an additional 
$413,000,000 can be added to bring the total to over $1 billion annually.  
The main reason the concept of a cost share is not a recommendation of this thesis 
is that it did not evaluate the potential negative impacts it could have on the budgets of the 
states or urban areas. Should this concept be considered in the future, it would require 
legislative changes, which in turn, would invite the opinions of these stakeholders on 
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whether the impact on their budgets would outweigh the return on investment a cost share 
would bring.  
3. Establish a Process for Determining the Impact of Grant Funding on 
Capability  
The research for this project has revealed that no conclusive data resulted to show 
the impact that FEMA’s preparedness grant funds was having on the Goal. All of FEMA’s 
preparedness grants require that the applicant tie investments to capability gaps identified 
through the THIRA/SPR process. Grant funding attributed to each capability was 
summarized in the NPR within the 2018 and 2019 NPRs and was discussed in Chapter IV. 
This data simply shows in which capabilities FEMA preparedness grant funds are being 
invested, but the correlation between grant funds and capability ends at this point. What it 
does not say is how the grant investments increased or sustained the capability. In Chapter 
IV, it was determined that most of capabilities are increasing or being centralized. 
However, it was also determined that it was not possible with the data provided to know 
how FEMA’s grant funding contributed to the improvements, which leaves half of the story 
untold. A process needs to be created to determine if the investments made by the states to 
address capability gaps actually made a difference.  
FEMA recently reincarnated the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant 
Program (RCPGP). The program, funded at $10 million, is focused on urban areas and 
specific to the core capabilities of Housing and Logistics and Supply Chain Management. 
Coincidentally, both of these capabilities were identified in Chapter IV as having been 
centralized. Logistics and housing have also been emphasized in the recent guidance for 
the EMPG. The fact that capability is being lost is an important measurement of which to 
be aware. Given this measurement, it makes sense that FEMA will place emphasis on these 
critical capabilities that need to be increased. However, without some process to gauge the 
outcome of these investments, how will FEMA know if this endeavor is working? 
In Chapter V, a connection was made between declining appropriations and the 
potential loss in capability. Congress consistently asks for proof that these investments are 
making a difference in the nation’s level of preparedness. Evidence in Chapter IV suggests 
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that the majority of capabilities are being increased but no means were available to relate 
this increase to the application of grant funds. Enacting a system to do so would bolster 
FEMA’s ability to make its case to Congress and potentially argue for more funding. 
Simply stating that the nation is steadily working toward achieving the goal without 
concrete evidence to suggest that FEMA funding is a large part of the reason, can 
potentially have a negative impact on ensuing appropriations, which in turn, affects future 
capability levels. 
A possible solution can be to ask grant applicants to add the current capability rating 
for the capabilities identified in their investment justifications along with an explanation of 
the expected outcome specific to the capability addressed. This process can be monitored 
by FEMA staff and reported on by the recipient throughout the lifespan of the award. The 
closeout report would include the capability rating at the conclusion of the grant along with 
the actual outcome to provide FEMA with rating data along with expected and actual 
outcomes to aid in the analysis of the impact the funding had on the capabilities addressed. 
The timing of closeouts can be a potential obstacle for mining this data, as not all awards 
are closed at the same time. The new RCPGP can be a good test case for this solution due 
to the narrow focus of the program and less awards to oversee.  
The primary reason it is not a recommendation is the development of this process 
is an area where future research is needed. It is a complex problem, which is likely why it 
is not already implemented. FEMA is currently in the process of developing a grants 
management system called FEMA Grant Outcomes that will eventually be the system with 
which all its 41 grant programs will be managed. This new system could represent a 
possible clearinghouse where the data needed to facilitate this process could be mined. In 
the end, capturing this outcome data could be the catalyst for other solutions to align 
FEMA’s preparedness grant programs better with the strategic intent of the Goal.  
The concepts proposed as part of this discussion are intended to be considered as 
ways FEMA’s preparedness grant programs can be better conformed to achieve the Goal. 
However, additional research and consideration into each of these topics need to be done 
to determine the potential negative effects associated with each scenario. These ideas, 
whether implemented on their own accord or in some combination, can have a significant 
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impact on the ability of states and urban areas to invest their grant funds flexibly to address 
any gap they may have in achieving the Goal. However, a simple change can be made in 
the language of the statues that authorize the HSGP to provide this flexibility. This concept 
is the subject of the recommendation section as follows. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The following recommendation is based on the analysis of trends from the previous 
chapters.  
The language in the Act as Amended, is the reason programs, such as SHSP and 
UASI, have a nexus to terrorism. However, the Act also establishes the mission of the 
agency, which extends beyond terrorism into areas, such as all-hazards planning, economic 
security, civil rights and liberties, and drug trafficking.148 This recommendation proposes 
that the language in the Act and subsequent program guidance be changed to reflect a nexus 
to security or homeland security. The concept of security could be represented in sectors 
as proposed by Malec or through the lens of lifelines as utilized by FEMA. The language 
could also be amended to address a nexus to homeland security, which could be aligned 
under the definition proposed by Bellavita, as it relates to FEMA’s 2018–2022 strategic 
plan. In either case, the amended language coincides with the spirit of the Act while 
eliminating the required nexus to a specific hazard. In turn, this adjustment will allow grant 
recipients the flexibility needed to ensure that their limited funding can be freely applied 
to their areas of greatest risk to include addressing the impacts of the opioid crisis, as noted 
in Chapter V, as being an area of risk that cannot be addressed through a nexus to terrorism. 
When considering the sectors of security, the opioid crisis impacts all these security sectors. 
This change may still require some legislative adjustments but not to the same 
extent if the programs were changed to address all-hazards, which may risk future 
appropriations as discussed earlier. Some concerns have also been raised that moving the 
focus of the programs from terrorism to security may impact investments being made in 
terrorism. However, the data provided in Chapter IV clearly indicates that most of the 
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funding is already being directed toward capabilities not solely terrorism focused. Congress 
to consider this change is not without risk. Legislative changes require discussion that can 
sometimes bring additional scrutiny and unpredictable results. However, the proposed 
changes do not take away from the focus on homeland security and the increased flexibility 
to align the grant programs with the achievement of the Goal outweigh any risks posed by 
the legislative process. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The primary takeaway from the research for this thesis is that FEMA’s 
preparedness grant programs and the Goal are mostly aligned. Nearly all the core 
capabilities outlined in the Goal apply to all-hazards, which allow the Goal to conform  
to the diversity of programs designed to address the risks faced by the state, local, tribal, 
and territorial jurisdictions that make up the nation. This flexibility has allowed grant 
recipients to increase their all-hazards preparedness even with investments requiring a 
nexus to terrorism.  
The advancements in capability have been slow but steady. Analysis in this thesis 
found that most capabilities have increased or centralized (meaning that middle ratings are 
growing) between 2014 and 2018. More than half of the grant funds between 2017 and 
2018 were invested in the capabilities of planning, operational coordination and operational 
communications.  
Congressional appropriations for FEMA grant programs predicated on 
preparedness have decreased. It is possible that capability could be lost if these 
appropriations decline further. However, an increase in the appropriations is unlikely 
unless FEMA can do a better job of showing Congress the eventual outcome of these 
investments and their impact on capability, which is beyond simply indicating the 
capabilities where investments are being made. A new system of measurement, along with 
loosening the required nexus to terrorism would allow grant recipients to align their 
investments better with risks and provide Congress with the justification needed to 
maintain or possibly increase the annual appropriations to FEMA’s preparedness grants. 
This mixture of funding and flexibility will ultimately lead to the achievement of the Goal. 
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APPENDIX.  CORE CAPABILITY PERCENTAGE CHANGES 
2014–2018 
This appendix is intended to provide additional context to the capability analysis 
found in Chapter IV. Each section is broken out by mission area and each capability is 
addressed under the mission area with which it is associated. Under the heading of each 
capability, the current capability status, whether increased, centralized, or lost, along with 
the current rating is indicated. In addition, charts are provided showing the change in  
the percentage of states rating themselves high, medium or low and the change in 
percentage from 2014–2018. A discussion section also briefly addresses the data indicated 
by the charts. 
A. COMMON CORE CAPABILITIES 
1. Planning  
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The planning capability has experienced some slight improvement since the 
inception of the Goal as indicated in Figure 8. A four percent decrease has resulted in states 
reporting themselves low. This loss is reflected in the gain of those rating themselves a 
medium or high. The NPRs from 2017 and 2018 indicate significant investments were 
made in planning. Despite spending nearly $700 million over the course of these two years, 
the capability has only seen modest gains.149 
 
149 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 8. Planning Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.150 
2. Public Information and Warning 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The public information and warning capability shown in Figure 9 has experienced 
a significant gain in the states rating themselves as medium and a small decrease in high 
and low ratings. It is encouraging to see a capability increasing from low ratings despite a 
comparably low investment in this area over the past two years.  
 
150 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 9. Public Information and Warning Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.151 
3. Operational Coordination 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
Despite its high rating, operational coordination was the most concerning of the 
three common core capabilities. The operational coordination capability was trending up 
until the 2017 and 2018 reports, as seen in Figure 10. It is difficult to assess why this high 
priority, cross-cutting capability would abruptly drop off. One possibility is that capability 
was lost in this area as a result of the major disasters in 2017 that affected many of the 
states making these assessments. Overall, the operational coordination capability has seen 
an increase in states rating their ability to meet their capability target at a medium, which 
indicates average proficiency. This capability has centralized from decreases in both high 
and low ratings. Despite the importance of this capability, and the nearly $600 million in 
grant funds invested over the last two years, the operational coordination capability has not 
realized an increase.152  
 
151 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
152 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 10. Operational Coordination Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.153 
B. PREVENTION/PROTECTION CORE CAPABILITIES 
1. Intelligence and Information Sharing  
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The intelligence and information sharing capability has experienced results similar 
to operational coordination, as demonstrated in Figure 11. Despite its current high rating, 
the capability has seen its gains in states rating themselves a medium. It has also seen  
a decrease in ratings for both low and high, which indicates the capability is centralizing. 
Of the capabilities that make up this mission area, intelligence and information sharing has 
seen the largest investment of grant funds at nearly $250 million over 2017 and 2018.154 
However, it has not resulted in an increase of the capability. 
 
153 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
154 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 11. Intelligence and Information Sharing Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.155 
2. Interdiction and Disruption  
Capability Status: Lost 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The interdiction and disruption capability has experienced a loss in capability from 
2014 to 2018, as shown in Figure 12. Even with the current rating of high, the data indicates 
that a four percent loss has occurred in states rating themselves high. The increase in 
medium ratings of medium reflects that capability lost from high has moved to a medium. 
This capability is the second highest funded at nearly $200 million over the last two 
years.156 The loss, despite the investment, makes it a capability in danger of decreasing to 
a lower rating. 
 
155 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
156 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 12. Interdiction and Disruption Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.157 
3. Screening, Search and Detection  
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The screening, search and detection capability has seen a significant increase in 
states rating themselves as a medium, as demonstrated in Figure 13. This increase, coupled 
with a decrease in ratings of low, is encouraging. A small decrease in ratings of high 
occurred, but in this context, it is much less concerning than capabilities where gains have 
been much less. 
 
157 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 13. Screening Search and Detection Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.158 
4. Forensics and Attribution 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
Unlike the screening, search and detection capability, forensics and attribution has 
seen a centralization from low and high ratings, as seen in Figure 14. This centralization 
has resulted in the capability moving from a high in 2014 to a current rating of medium. 
 
158 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 14. Forensics and Attribution Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.159 
5. Physical Protective Measures 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
Physical protective measures have experienced an increase in states rating 
themselves a medium. This increase is offset by decreases in both low and high ratings 
centralizing to medium, as shown in Figure 15. Over the last couple of years, over 
$100 million has been invested in this capability.160 The hope is that these investments will 
eventually result in increased high ratings. 
 
159 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
160 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 15. Physical Protective Measures Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.161 
6. Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The risk management for protection programs and activities capability has seen a 
large increase in states rating themselves a medium, as indicated in Figure 16. This result 
is caused by capability centralizing from a loss in percentages from low and high ratings. 
The loss of the high rating and increase in medium has moved this capability from a high 
rating in 2014 to a current rating of medium. 
 
161 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 16. Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities 
Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.162 
7. Access Control and Identity Verification 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
Access control and identity verification is in a similar situation as risk management 
for protection programs and activities in that gains have been made in states rating 
themselves as Low, as shown in Figure 17. However, high ratings have also experienced 
an increase. Given the current low rating, it is encouraging to see the percentages decrease 
in this area.  
 
162 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 17. Access Control and Identity Verification Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.163 
8. Supply Chain Integrity and Security  
Capability Status: Lost 
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
The supply chain integrity and security is one of the more concerning capabilities 
in the protection and prevention mission area. Decreases have occurred in states rating 
themselves high and with an increase in ratings of low, which is indicative of a capability 
in decline, as indicated in Figure 18. One reason can be the lack of funding focused in this 
area. Of all the capabilities in this mission area, supply chain integrity and security is the 
least funded at less than a half million a year.164 
 
163 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
164 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 18. Supply Chain Integrity and Security Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.165 
9. Cybersecurity 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
The cybersecurity capability has seen significant increases in states rating 
themselves medium, as seen in Figure 19. When considering that a nearly equal decrease 
has occurred in ratings of low, the capability has been increased overall despite its current 
low rating.  
 
Figure 19. Cybersecurity Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.166 
 
165 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
166 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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C. MITIGATION CORE CAPABILITIES 
1. Threats and Hazards Identification 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The threats and hazards identification capability is rated at high and has 
experienced a large increase in capability over time, as shown in Figure 20. It is signified 
by a decrease in states rating themselves a low along with increases in both of the other 
rating levels.  
 
Figure 20. Threats and Hazards Identification Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.167 
2. Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The risk and disaster resilience assessment shows decreases in states rating 
themselves a low or medium along with an increase in ratings of high, as demonstrated in 
 
167 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 21. Given this significant increase to offset the decrease in other areas, this 
capability is on the upswing. 
 
Figure 21. Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.168 
3. Community Resilience  
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
Similar to other capabilities in the mitigation mission area, community resilience 
has seen a significant increase in capability. The decrease in ratings of low, coupled with 
increases in both corresponding areas, represents a capability that is moving upward, as 
indicated in Figure 22. This movement is likely due to the significant amount of funding 
provided to the states through the various FEMA grant opportunities offered for the area 
of mitigation. These opportunities include Section 406 mitigation offered through the 
Public Assistance program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program that is also related to 
major disaster declarations. FEMA has just instituted a new program called Building 
Resilient Infrastructure in Communities grant, which is in addition to the programs in the 
Hazard Mitigation Assistance program. Minimal amounts of preparedness funding are 
 
168 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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being used toward mitigation, which indicates the capabilities are being built utilizing 
investments from the other more mitigation specific funding mechanisms.  
 
Figure 22. Community Resilience Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.169 
4. Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The long-term vulnerability reduction capability indicates a huge move from states 
rating themselves low up to medium, as shown in Figure 23. A slight increase has occurred 
in ratings of high, which indicates this capability is moving in the right direction. 
 
169 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 23. Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.170 
D. RESPONSE CORE CAPABILITIES 
1. Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
Public health, healthcare, and emergency medical services were changed in the 
2nd edition of the Goal from public health and medical services, as provided in Figure 24. 
Since then, it has made strides toward becoming a mature high rated capability. Data from 
2014 to 2018 indicates that three percent of states have moved their ratings for this 
capability from a low to a high.  
 
170 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 24. Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical 
Services Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.171 
2. On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement 
Capability Status: Centralized  
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The on-scene security, protection, and law enforcement capability has seen modest 
gains in states rating themselves a medium and a small decrease in ratings of low or high, 
as seen in Figure 25. This capability is being centralized. 
 
171 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 25. On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement 
Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.172 
3. Operational Communications  
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current rating: High 
Discussion: 
The operational communications capability indicates an identical decrease in states 
rating themselves a low or high. This decrease, as shown in Figure 26, has resulted in an 
increase in the medium rating percentage. This movement from both high and low to 
medium is indicative of a centralizing capability. The loss of the high rating is even more 
concerning when considering nearly $300 million has been invested in this area over the 
last two years.173 
 
172 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
173 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 26. Operational Communications Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.174 
4. Situational Assessment 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The situational assessment capability is rated a 4–5. However, the data reflects 
decreases in states rating themselves a 1 or 2, or a 4 or 5, as seen in Figure 27. These 
decreases are reflected in a significant increase in ratings of three. Despite these gains, a 
slight loss of maturity has occurred in the capability denoting that this capability in being 
maintained as opposed to increased. 
 
174 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 27. Situational Assessment Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.175 
5. Environmental Response/Health and Safety 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The environmental response/health and safety capability has experienced a 
significant increase in states rating themselves a medium coupled with a decrease in ratings 
of low or high, as shown in Figure 28. Given that this capability is showing slight losses in 
ratings of high, the increase in medium ratings is only indicative of a capability being 
centralized. 
 
175 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 28. Environmental Response/Health and Safety Percentages 
and Changes 2014 to 2018.176 
6. Fire Management and Suppression 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The fire management and suppression capability is one of the newest of the 
32 capabilities and was rated fairly high from its inception, as presented in Figure 29. The 
limited data for this capability still indicates a net increase across the board from ratings of 
low to high. One possibility for this increase is the existence of grant programs specifically 
for the fire service. Despite this funding mechanism, this capability is far from the highest 
funded in the response mission area. 
 
176 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 29. Fire Management and Suppression Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.177 
7. Critical Transportation 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The critical transportation capability, despite its current rating of high, has 
experienced a loss in the percentage of states rating themselves high, as demonstrated in 
Figure 30. Some modest gains have occurred from low up to medium. The percentage 
change indicates this capability is centralizing. Despite the critical nature of this capability, 
it has been one of the lowest funded capabilities over the past two years.178 
 
177 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
178 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 9. 
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Figure 30. Critical Transportation Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.179 
8. Mass Search and Rescue Operations 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The mass search and rescue operations capability, as seen in Figure 31, indicates a 
decrease in ratings from low to medium. The increases made to the capability are indicative 
of a capability being increased. The lack of increase in high ratings is in spite of large 
investments made nationwide to build urban search and rescue capabilities.180 
 
179 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11  
180 National Homeland Security Consortium, Homeland Security Grant Return on Investment, 5. 
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Figure 31. Mass Search and Rescue Operations Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.181 
9. Fatality Management Services 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Bimodal 
Discussion: 
The fatality management services capability has made some significant gains since 
2014. The data indicates that a significant decrease has resulted in states rating themselves 
low and a slight increase in ratings of high, as shown in Figure 32. The 2018 NPR indicates 
that the same percentage of states rated themselves low or high. Those rating themselves a 
medium made up the lesser amount, but because the other ratings were identical, the current 
rating was determined to be bimodal. This capability was the only one for which a specific 
mode could not be determined. The gains made in this capability are in spite of it being 
one of the lowest funded capabilities in the mission area. 
 
181 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 32. Fatality Management Services Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.182 
10. Mass Care Services 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The mass care services capability, as with many being built, saw an increase in 
states rating themselves as a high or medium while experiencing decreases in ratings of 
low. See Figure 33. 
 
182 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11.  
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Figure 33. Mass Care Services Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.183 
11. Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The logistics and supply chain management capability was originally known as 
public and private services and resources. This change was made with the release of the 
2nd edition of the Goal. The capability has seen an increase in ratings of medium and an 
identical decrease in states rating themselves as low or high, as provided in Figure 34. The 
movement from both ends of the spectrum to the medium rating represents a capability that 
is centralizing. 
 
183 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 34. Logistics and Supply Chain Management Percentages and 
Changes 2014 to 2018.184 
12. Infrastructure Systems 
Capability Status: Lost 
Current Rating: Medium 
Discussion: 
The infrastructure systems capability is shared between the response and recovery 
mission areas. A significant increase in states rating themselves medium has occurred. 
However, low ratings have also seen an increase, as seen in Figure 35. Coupled with a 
negative movement in the high ratings, the capability is being lost. With the slip from high 
to medium, this capability is possibly in danger of declining further. 
 
184 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 35. Infrastructure Systems Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.185 
E. RECOVERY CORE CAPABILITIES 
1. Economic Recovery 
Capability Status: Centralized 
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
The economic recovery capability, despite its current low rating, is experiencing a 
major upswing in states rating themselves a low to a medium. However, these positive 
increases have been offset by a decrease in high ratings that indicate that the capability is 
centralizing to medium. Refer to Figure 36. 
 
185 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 36. Economic Recovery Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.186 
2. Health and Social Services  
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: High 
Discussion: 
The health and social services capability is moving in the correct direction. High 
ratings are increasing as are medium ratings. When considering the decrease of low ratings, 
this capability is on the rise. See Figure 37. 
 
186 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 37. Health and Social Services Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.187 
3. Housing  
Capability Status: Centralized  
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
The housing capability is indicating a significant loss in states rating themselves 
high. This reduction has resulted in an increase in ratings of medium, as given in Figure 
38. Even though these show a decrease in low ratings, it does not eclipse the losses in the 
area of higher rating and retains its current rating. The housing capability, as in the case for 
operational coordination, may have been impacted by the recent disasters in 2017 and 2018, 
which resulted in challenges restoring long-term housing.188  
 
187 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
188 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Preparedness Report, 56. 
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Figure 38. Housing Percentages and Changes 2014 to 2018.189 
4. Natural and Cultural Resources 
Capability Status: Increased 
Current Rating: Low 
Discussion: 
The natural and cultural resources capability shows significant movement from 
those states rating themselves a low to a medium in conjunction with a slight increase in 
ratings of high rating. However, this progress has not been enough to move it from its 
current low rating. Refer to Figure 39. 
 
189 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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Figure 39. Natural and Cultural Resources Percentages and Changes 
2014 to 2018.190 
  
 
190 Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014 National Preparedness Report, 10; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018 National Preparedness Report, 11. 
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